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Abstract: This paper empirically evaluates the price effects of the merger of two major book 
retail chains in the UK: Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s. We employ differences-in-differences 
techniques and use a rich dataset containing monthly scanner data information on a sample of 
200 books sold in 60 stores in 50 different local markets for a period of four years around the 
merger. Since retail mergers may have either local or national effects (or both) according to 
the level at which retail chains set prices, we undertake an ex-post assessment of the impact of 
the merger at both levels. At the local level, we compare the changes in the average price 
charged before and after the merger in the shops located in overlap areas –i.e. areas where 
both chains were present before the merger– and in non-overlap areas –i.e. areas where only 
one chain was present before the merger. At the national level, we employ two distinct control 
groups to evaluate the merger, namely the competitors and the top-selling titles. We find that 
the merger did not result in an increase in prices either at the local or at the national level. We 
also perform heterogeneous treatment effects estimations in order to assess whether the effect 
of the merger differs along various dimensions of heterogeneity that are present in our data. 
 
Keywords: Mergers, Ex-post Evaluation, Book market, Retail sector 
JEL Classification: K21, L24, L44, D22, O32  
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: Elena Argentesi, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 
40126 Bologna, Italy, Tel: + 39 051 2098661, Fax: +39 051 2098040, E-Mail: elena.argentesi@unibo.it. This 
paper is partially based on a research project we undertook for the UK Competition Commission (CC). Paolo 
Buccirossi and Cristiana Vitale were coauthors of that report and offered continuous guidance for this paper; 
therefore we extend our sincere gratitude for their council and contributions. We are also grateful to Luca 
Barbarito, Peter Haan, Cristian Huse, Adam Lederer, Chiara Monfardini, Massimo Motta, Amrita Ray 
Chaudhuri, and Daniel Rubinfeld for very useful suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge comments from 
seminar participants at the 2012 CRESSE Conference, Jornadas de Economia Industrial 2012, SIE Conference, 
DIW Berlin, Time Series and Competition Policy Workshop (Stellenbosch University), University of Padua, and 
University of Bologna. We also wish to thank the CC’s staff for the support provided during the course of this 
study, and Carlotta Dandolo, Giulio Altomari, Roberto Alimonti and Roberto Cervone for their excellent 
research assistance. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in retrospective merger studies, which comes principally from the 
need to understand how mergers alter market structure and welfare. Yet, additional motivation 
behind this increased interest lies in the perceived need for antitrust agencies to check and 
improve the effectiveness of their decision making (e.g. Kovacic, 2009). Moreover, from an 
academic perspective, retrospective merger evaluations are seen as useful tools to validate 
structural models for merger simulation, which are increasingly used as an ex-ante instrument 
to assess policy changes.1 
Despite a growing number of studies that analyze the price effect of mergers in a 
variety of industries, little work exists on the ex-post evaluation of mergers in the retailing 
sector.2 This is particularly surprising since not only do retail markets constitute a significant 
part of the economy in terms of value added and employment in all developed countries but 
these markets are experiencing a great deal of merger activity. Moreover, as noted by Hosken 
et al. (2012), mergers in retailing are often subject to antitrust scrutiny. For instance, out of 
176 grocery markets subject to merger control by the US Federal Trade Commission between 
1996 and 2011, 152 were challenged.3 Similarly, the European Commission (EC) reviewed an 
increasing number of retailing mergers over the past two decades. Out of the 167 mergers in 
retail trade analyzed by the EC between 1990 and 2008, 13 were denied or approved with 
specific conditions and obligations. 
Mergers in retailing sectors present some specific features that differentiate them from 
concentrations in other markets and that should be considered in the merger review process as 
well as in any retrospective study.4 In particular, they are characterized by dispersed buyers 
and sellers (Davis, 2006): Consumers tend to make their purchases within their local shopping 
location and retail businesses generally have multiple outlets across a country. Yet, retail 
offers may be set either nationally or locally, which creates an interplay between local and 
                                                 
1
 See Nevo and Whinston (2010) and Weinberg (2011). For a recent contribution which uses ex-post merger 
analysis to validate a simulation model, see Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012). 
2
 Among these very few papers, Hastings (2004) analyzes the effects of a merger in the gasoline retail market in 
the US. Skrainka (2012) studies instead the effects of the merger between two UK grocery retailers using 
consumer data. Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weiberg (2009) and Duso (2012) present a review of the recent 
literature on ex-post merger studies. 
3
 See Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal years 1996 – 2011, Federal Trade Commission Table 4.2. 
Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130104horizontalmergerreport.pdf.  
4
 Indeed, the opening passage of the recent joint UK Competition Commission/Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
report on retail mergers (Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, 2011; p. 4) reads: “Retail mergers 
account for a significant number of cases that come before the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition 
Commission.... Moreover, some of the questions that such mergers raise are largely specific to the sector.” 
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national competition. This aspect is particularly relevant for merger assessment, since it 
implies that any concentration may impact competition at different geographical levels. This 
feature should therefore be taken into account in the design of any retrospective evaluation 
exercise in these industries.5 
The focus of the few existing academic papers and most of the policy studies on 
retailing industries is on mergers in the food sector. However, other retail markets are also 
important. One example is the market for books, which shares several peculiar features with 
the markets for creative goods such as music records, movies, video games, and software. 
Given the unpredictable and usually short lasting popularity, books are generally 
characterized by a very short life cycle (like fashion products) as well as by uncertain demand 
and short periods of high profitability.6 Moreover, they can be considered to be experience 
goods that are not typically purchased more than once. The fact that books are short-lived and 
have largely volatile sales poses particular challenges for the analysis of the effect of 
competition on prices in this industry. The same book title may have a different value to 
consumers in different periods of time and, therefore, retailers’ pricing policy may change 
accordingly. Moreover, publishers have a rapidly changing portfolio of books. Therefore, for 
ex-post merger analysis, it would be incorrect to identify the effect of the merger by simply 
looking at the price evolution of a constant sample of products. 
The above considerations suggest the need of expanding the existing evaluation 
methodologies and the importance of providing new empirical evidence to improve our 
understanding of competition in retailing sectors and, specifically, cultural goods markets. 
This study tries to address these issues by analyzing the effect of a consummated merger in 
the retail book sector. Waterstone’s acquisition of Ottakar’s –two of the major book retailers 
in the UK at that time– was announced in 2005 and cleared by the UK Competition 
Commission (CC) in 2006. In its investigation, the CC identified problematic local markets 
where both the merging parties competed before the merger (overlap areas) and where the 
concentration was expected to have the potential for significant anti-competitive effects.  
Hence, to identify the causal effect of this concentration, we compare the price 
evolution of the products sold by the merging parties in the overlap areas with the price 
                                                 
5
 Other peculiarities of retail industries are considered in previous studies. One such peculiarity is the presence of 
vertical structures with relevant buyer power (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007). This aspect is analyzed by Pita Barros 
et al. (2006), who empirically investigate the effect of a merger on the bargaining power of retailers vis-à-vis 
producers in the food retailing sector. Davis (2005) studies the impact of local competition on prices in the 
movie theater market. 
6
 See Canoy et al. (2006) and Beck (2007) for in-depth descriptions of the features of the book industry. 
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evolution of their products in areas where only one chain was present pre-merger (non-
overlap areas) by employing a differences-in-differences (DiD) approach.7 We quantify the 
price effects of the merger by using a rich dataset containing scanner data information on a 
sample of 200 books, sold in 60 stores, in 50 different local markets over a period of four 
years around the merger (2004-2007). Because of the peculiarities of the market for books 
discussed above, we look at the effect of the merger on the prices of a selected sample of titles 
that varies year by year instead of comparing the same set of titles before and after the merger 
in a fixed-effect framework. Thus, the price of different books is modeled by means of a 
hedonic approach as a function of the products’ characteristics (e.g. Pakes, 2003).8 This 
enables us to more correctly identify the effect of a policy change –i.e. the merger decision– 
on the price level, since any price difference due to the changes in the products’ 
characteristics is accounted for in the regression. 
As outlined in a joint report by the CC and the Office of Fair Trading (Competition 
Commission and Office of Fair Trading, 2011), it is often difficult to find evidence of local 
effects of mergers because of data limitations. On this issue, our case study has a major 
advantage with respect to previous studies since we have accurate data at different levels of 
aggregation, which allow us to assess both the local and the national effect of the 
concentration. Moreover, the peculiar structure of our database helps us to alleviate the main 
potential shortcoming of the DiD methodology: the choice of the appropriate control group.9 
As discussed by Nevo and Whinston (2010), finding a suitable control group to estimate the 
causal effect of a merger on prices is difficult in many industries. In this respect, the features 
of the retailing sector make it a good field of application, since one can exploit the variation in 
the competitive conditions across local markets (Hastings, 2004 and Choné and Linnemer, 
                                                 
7
 Other papers pursing the DiD methodology in merger analysis are Focarelli and Panetta (2003); Hastings 
(2004); Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009); Ashenfelter and Hosken (2011); Ashenfelter, Hosken and 
Weinberg (2013); Choné and Linnemer (2012). See Weinberg (2008) and Hunter, Leonard and Olley (2008) for 
a survey. A growing strand of literature instead follows a structural approach; see Friberg and Romahn (2012), 
Skrainka (2012), and Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012). 
8
 A similar problem is faced by Ashenfelter et al. (2013), who analyze the price effects of a merger between two 
appliance manufacturers in the US. Dealing with products with short lifetimes, they also use a model with 
product characteristics to account for product quality. Unlike them, however, we explicitly build a post-merger 
sample of titles that reflects the distribution of the observable characteristics in the entire population of titles. 
Our methodological framework could be applied to other mergers in this industry, or in related industries sharing 
the same features. Indeed, we employ a similar methodology in the assessment of the effects of another merger 
between two retailers of videogames (GAME Group plc and Game Station) in the UK (Aguzzoni et al., 2011). 
9
 As Friberg and Romahn (2012) point out, another challenge in the application of such methodology is the 
difficulty of properly identifying before- and after-merger periods. In our setting, however, the definition of the 
timing of the merger does not pose particular problems, especially because the merger was cleared without any 
remedies. 
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2012). More specifically, we make an accurate choice of counterfactual areas by using a 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology, which allows us to select non-overlap areas 
that closely match overlap areas in terms of observable demand and supply characteristics.  
In addition to analyzing the effects of the merger on local pricing, the structure of our 
dataset allows us to also investigate the country-wide effect of the merger on prices. The 
national analysis provides important complementary evidence on the effect of the merger by 
using a similar empirical framework as for the local analysis, but with a different level of data 
aggregation and with different counterfactuals. In particular, we estimate the impact of the 
merger on the aggregate national price of the same selection of titles relying on two different 
control groups: i) the same titles sold by the competitors and ii) a sample of the most sold 
books in a given year, which are expected to be less affected by the merger given the greater 
degree of competition they face from other retailers, including supermarkets and the 
internet.10 
At the local level, the results of our average treatment effect analysis show that there is 
no significant difference in prices after the merger between non-overlap and overlap areas 
where the merger should have been reasonably expected to generate the strongest effect. Yet, 
to more precisely identify the impact of the merger on the price of differentiated products, we 
further estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by exploiting the richness of our data along 
different dimensions: firm-specific, book-specific, and market-specific. First, the analysis of 
firm-specific variables suggests that there was a price convergence among the merging parties 
in overlap areas after the merger for most book categories. Hence, despite the overall effect of 
the merger on prices is not significant, we find some evidence that Waterstone’s stores 
increased prices while Ottakar’s stores reduced them in local overlap areas. Second, we 
perform book-specific heterogeneous treatment effects in order to investigate whether the 
merger influences products existing prior to the merger differently from products introduced 
after the merger as suggested by Ashenfelter et al. (2013). In particular, we look at the timing 
of discounts retailers set over the prices recommended by the publishers on books released 
post-merger. Finally, market-specific variables that should capture the intensity of local 
competition do not seem to play a significant role in explaining the causal effect of the 
merger.   
                                                 
10
 While the former set of control groups is used in earlier literature, using products exposed to a different degree 
of competition as a control group is a methodological innovation of our approach. 
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At the national level, by using two different control groups, we do not find any 
significant price increases due to the merger. The dynamics of prices in this industry seem 
instead to be driven mainly by structural changes and, in particular, by the rapid growth of 
low-cost retailers, such as online bookstores and supermarkets, and the merger does not 
appear to have had any adverse impact on price competition. Therefore, the CC’s decision to 
approve the merger seems to have been appropriate as long as the price effect is concerned.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we discuss the institutional 
setting and, in particular, the characteristics of the book industry and the merger. Section 3 
contains a description of our dataset. We then present our main empirical analysis in Section 
4. We present the analysis on the effect of the merger at the national level in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Book Industry and the Merger 
The supply chain of the book industry is characterized by three groups of players: publishers, 
wholesalers, and retailers. Publishers lie at the top of the value chain, working with authors 
and producing books. Although the UK has over 10,000 publishers, in 2005 the ten largest 
groups represented more than half of total consumer sales, both by value and volume. 
Wholesalers are the bridge between publishers and retailers, as they non-exclusively purchase 
from the former and sell to the latter. They mainly supply independent bookshops (i.e. 
retailers with up to five outlets), although they also supply internet shops and other retailers.  
Retailers can be broadly classified into four groups: 1) retailers specialized in the sales of 
books, as well as small independent bookshops; 2) non-specialist retailers for which books are 
an important category; 3) retailers for which books are part of a wide range of goods, such as 
supermarkets and major multiples; and 4) online book retailers.  These categories differ in the 
range of titles they hold: specialist shops and online retailers offer a large selection, whilst 
supermarkets and major multiples hold fewer titles, mainly the market’s current best-sellers. 
In the UK retail book market, as well as in other countries, pricing takes the form of 
setting the level of the discount off the recommended retail price (RRP), which is usually 
printed on the book by the publishers and acts as a ceiling for the retail price.11 Publishers 
generally set the RRPs according to estimates on what the market would bear (taking into 
                                                 
11
 Davies et al. (2004) and an OFT report (Office of Fair Trading, 2008) prepared by the Centre of Competition 
Policy at the University of East Anglia also provide in-depth overviews of pricing policies and regulations in the 
UK book market. 
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account the expected discounts offered by retailers) and to cost-related demand shifters (type 
of binding, presence of colored images, etc.).12 In the UK market, discounts differ by title 
categories, which are defined on the basis of the sales' ranking. In particular, discounts are 
generally larger for bestsellers –i.e. the top 5,000 titles sold in one year– than for deep-range 
titles –i.e. the remaining titles.13 The prices offered by retailers depend, to some extent, on the 
discounts they are able to negotiate upstream. In general, independent bookshops receive the 
smallest discounts, while supermarkets and book clubs negotiate the largest. The structure of 
discounts comprises a standard discount, typically over the entire publisher’s range, and a 
promotional discount for some specific titles. Price-promoted books are generally 
prominently displayed by retailers. Nonetheless, there are other activities to attract consumers, 
including book reviews, bestseller lists in print media, direct advertising to consumers, as well 
as publicity events (e.g. book signings and author readings).14 
We analyze the UK book industry around the time when the merger between two of 
the major book retailers (Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s) took place. Table 1 reports the national 
market shares in 2005, the year when the merger was announced. The main trends, up to 
2005, has been a sharp growth in the market share of supermarkets and online retailers (both 
increased by 4% between 2001 and 2005), and a decrease in the share of non-internet distance 
sellers (principally book clubs).15 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
With regard to the degree of concentration, at the time of the merger the combined 
share of the merging parties was 24%. The shares of the four largest retailers (i.e. WHSmith, 
Waterstone’s, Ottakar’s and Borders) summed up to 45%; 55% if only deep-range books are 
considered. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Clerides (2002) provides evidence of the fact that book prices seem to depend more on cost-related demand 
shifters than on pure demand shifters (new editions, author’s previous publications). Beck (2004) empirically 
analyzes the role of resale price maintenance in the book industry. 
13
 The cut-off of 5,000 was identified by the CC as the threshold separating these two categories, because it 
appeared to be the point at which discounting began to level off (Cfr. “HMV Group plc and Ottakar’s plc 
Proposed acquisition of Ottakar’s plc by HMV Group plc through Waterstone’s Booksellers Ltd”, 12th of May 
2006, p. 14). 
14
 See Sorensen (2007) for an assessment of the impact of bestseller lists on book sales. 
15
 Anecdotal evidence from a survey that we ran on market participants suggests that there was a growing 
competitive pressure from online retailers and from supermarkets during the years under examination. This 
seems to be due to their aggressive discounts policy. For more details see Aguzzoni et al. (2011). 
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2.1 The Merger 
In August 2005 two of the major book retailers, Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s, announced their 
intention to merge. At the time of the merger announcement, Waterstone’s was controlled by 
the HMV Group.16 Waterstone’s, the book-retailing segment, had 190 stores in the UK, each 
with a selection of titles, generally, between 30,000 and 40,000. Ottakar’s was established in 
1987 with the aim of creating a chain of bookshops in market towns throughout the UK. After 
opening its first store, it grew both organically and through acquisitions, reaching 141 stores 
by December 31, 2005. Its stores averaged between 20,000 and 30,000 titles. 
The CC defined the product market as the retail sale of new books to consumers. It 
also considered segmenting the market between bestsellers and deep-range titles. The CC 
found evidence that the competitive conditions on the two segments could differ as 
supermarkets and internet retailers’ commercial offer focused on bestsellers, but it then 
rejected this definition since there were no retailers selling only deep-range titles and the 
distinction between deep-range and bestseller titles was somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, in 
our analysis we account for the possibility that different title categories are subject to different 
competitive conditions and are therefore affected by the merger in a different way. In order to 
do so, we also perform our empirical exercise on each category separately. Concerning the 
geographical dimension, the CC also considered whether competition was at the national or 
local level by examining three dimensions of competition: prices, range of titles stocked, and 
service quality. The CC claimed that the parties usually set uniform national prices and, as a 
result, local competition was generally in terms of titles range and service quality.  
The merger investigation lead the CC to conclude that the  proposed  merger was not 
expected to result in an substantial lessening of competition in the market for the retail sale of 
new books (best-sellers or deep-range titles) at a local, regional or national level. As a result, 
the CC cleared the merger unconditionally on May 12, 2006.   
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
To perform our empirical analysis, we built two different datasets, one at the store level and 
one at the national level. We acquired from Nielsen data on the volumes and values for a 
sample of 200 book titles sold by 60 of Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores. Nielsen provided 
                                                 
16
 The HMV group is a global entertainment retail chain. It bought the Waterstone’s chain in 1998 and merged it 
with its own bookstore chain called Dillon. The HMV group eventually sold the Waterstone’s chain in 2011. 
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us with weekly figures for these variables, as well as data on several book specific 
characteristics for each selected area, from the first week of January 2004 through the last 
week of December 2007.17 Moreover, we obtained data on nationally aggregated volumes and 
values for the same sample of titles over the same time-span, separately for the merging 
parties and for the entire market. Value and volume figures for the competitors are then 
obtained as difference between the data of the entire market and those of the merging parties. 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe how we selected the sample of stores and titles. 
To complete our data, we also gathered information from public sources on socio-
economic characteristics (such as population, GDP, internet penetration, etc.) –both at the 
local and the national level– that we used in the selection of the 60 stores covered in our 
analysis as well as additional control variables in the econometric exercises. A description of 
these control variables is provided in section 3.3. 
 
3.1. The Choice of the Stores 
The DiD analysis at the local level requires the identification of stores to include in the 
treatment and control groups. We define the treatment group as the Waterstone’s and 
Ottakar’s stores from overlap areas, i.e. local areas where both chains were present before the 
merger, and the control group as the Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores from non-overlap 
areas.18 For the years 2004-2007, the Nielsen Bookscan panel, from which our data are 
retrieved, contains a total of 359 Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores located in 203 different 
areas (at the local authority level), of which 33 are the overlap areas identified by the CC and 
170 are non-overlap areas.19 While ideally we would like to have data on all stores in all 
areas, due to budget constraints this was unfeasible. Accordingly, we built a sample of 60 
stores in which the number of Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s outlets is equally split between 
overlap and non-overlap areas (i.e. 30 and 30). For the overlap areas, we draw the 30 stores 
                                                 
17
 Throughout the analysis we aggregate data at the monthly level, since the weekly data might have too much 
undue variation that may not reflect actual changes in the pricing policies of the retailers. In particular, when the 
volumes sold are low, the average price is affected by typing errors and by the nature of the sales (i.e. whether 
stand-alone or part of a bundle). Aggregating at the monthly level alleviates this problem. 
18
 The CC noticed: “… local competition, to the extent that it exists, is concentrated on nearby stores (within the 
same shopping location), and also encompasses out-of-town stores which may themselves be shopping 
destinations, such as supermarkets and Borders’ superstores. Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s do not in general have 
such destination stores and therefore our assessment of local competition was focused on nearby locations, in 
particular 33 overlap areas, located over the entire breadth of Great Britain.” (Cfr. “HMV Group plc and 
Ottakar’s plc Proposed acquisition of Ottakar’s plc by HMV Group plc through Waterstone’s Booksellers Ltd”, 
12th of May 2006, p. 5). 
19
 Cfr. Appendix E of the CC decision. 
10 
 
from 20 different areas. We select one store for each chain in 10 overlap areas. Then, to 
increase the coverage of overlap areas, we draw five additional Waterstone’s stores from five 
overlap areas and the last five Ottakar’s stores from a different set of five overlap areas. 
Hence, we cover a total of 20 different overlap areas. As for the control group, we select 30 
non-overlap areas: 15 in which we observe only Waterstone’s stores and 15 with only 
Ottakar’s stores. 
To summarize, the 60 stores in our sample are selected from a total of 50 areas of 
which 20 are overlap areas and 30 non-overlap areas. Once the number of areas and the type 
of stores required was decided, we chose a method to select the specific areas to be included 
in our sample. The key challenge is to choose areas for the control group that closely 
resemble the ones chosen for the treatment group in terms of demand and supply conditions 
such that any post-merger difference between the two groups can be attributed to the merger. 
Hence, we select two groups of areas with homogeneous observable characteristics and we 
assume that the non-observable characteristics are similarly distributed.  
To this aim we use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology.20 PSM 
postulates that the probability of treatment depends on observable characteristics and the 
actual assignment is random once one accounts for the predicted probability of treatment. It is 
then possible to build a control group using these predicted probabilities. In our case, the 
treatment is the presence of both chains in the same area. Hence, we postulate that the overlap 
and non-overlap areas may have similar probability of treatment as they share similar demand 
and supply conditions, although we observe only some treated areas. 
In our selection mechanism, we use all 203 areas in the Nielsen panel and for each of 
them we collect a wide range of information on local market conditions that might affect the 
demand and supply sides in book markets (population, presence of universities, gross value 
added, internet penetration, average house prices, etc.; see Section 3.3. for a description of 
these variables). Based on these observables, we first estimate the predicted probability of 
treatment (propensity score) for each area. Out of 33 overlap areas we could only select 20 
that matched our requirements. Indeed we first exclude three overlap area since their 
estimated propensity score is outside the common support (they do not have any “close” 
match in the non-overlap sample). Then, due to data limitations (either the shop was not in 
Nielsen Bookscan panel or it had closed), we dropped 10 additional localities. Finally, for 
                                                 
20
 For a more detailed description of the application of the PSM, see Appendix 1. 
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each of the selected overlap areas we identified the closest match among the non-overlap 
areas, i.e. the area that exhibits the closest propensity score.21  
 
3.2. The Choice of the Titles 
During its inquiry, the CC considered whether there was a separate market for bestselling and 
deep-range titles; the latter being those books ranked 5,001 or lower in sales. Although it 
concluded that this was not the case, the CC recognized that the merger may have had a 
different impact on these titles due to the lower degree of competition that characterizes the 
sale of deep-range titles. Indeed, while bestselling titles faced strong and growing 
competition, in particular from supermarkets, non-specialist stores, and internet retailers, 
deep-range titles appeared less affected by these competitive constraints because 
supermarkets and non-specialists stores stocked only a small number of such titles.22 There is 
no evidence that the competitive framework between bestseller and deep-range titles has 
significantly changed since the merger, although supermarkets and non-specialist retailers 
have apparently enlarged the range of the deep-range titles kept in stock.23 Therefore, we want 
to account for these possible differences in our analysis. 
 Excluding titles in the “deep-range” category, we are left with books in the top 5,000 
of annual sales. Although these books sell broadly, these titles differ greatly with respect to 
the volumes sold. For instance, in 2007 the volume of the 200 most sold titles represented 
around 33% of the total sales of bestsellers, with an average of more than 214,000 copies 
sold. On the other hand, the 200 books ranked from 4,800 through 5,000 represent just 1% of 
the total sales, with an average of 7,100 copies sold per title. Hence, we suspect that the 
retailers’ pricing policy may significantly differ across these 5,000 titles.  
 First, we identify a set of titles that may be characterized by a particular pricing policy, 
which we call “evergreen”. These titles are sold in reasonable high volumes for many years 
and appear to be consistently among the bestsellers for a longer period of time. In principle, 
they are subject to unique competitive pressures because evergreens are sold across a variety 
of retail channels that otherwise devote limited space to books–i.e. non-specialist retailers and 
                                                 
21
 From the non-overlap areas we exclude the London ones, as there was no overlap area located in London. The 
matching between overlap and non-overlap is without replacement; that is a non-overlap area cannot be matched 
with more than one overlap area. 
22
 Despite the fact that specialist retailers face competition on deep-range titles from Internet retailers, discounts 
on this category of titles are much smaller than on bestsellers. 
23
 See Clark and Phillips (2008), p. 243. 
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supermarkets– as they can guarantee a quite stable flow of sales. For the purpose of this 
paper, we include in this category those titles that were ranked among the 5,000 most sold 
books across the entire period under analysis. 
 Of the remaining books, we define “top-sellers” to be those titles that were ranked 
among the 200 most sold books in any given calendar year. Indeed, supermarkets –which are 
by far the strongest price competitors of the specialist retailers– tend to concentrate their 
offers for those books that many consumers are interested in purchasing and have a high 
position in the sales rankings. Therefore, the pricing strategy of the merging parties for these 
titles might be different from the one adopted for other frequently sold books. In the event 
that a book could be included in either the evergreen or top-seller category, we define it to be 
a “top-seller” for that specific calendar year. This leaves us with the “bestseller” category, 
which includes all top 5,000 titles that are not already defined to be “evergreen” or “top-
seller”. As a result, our definition of bestsellers is somewhat different from the CC’s one 
because it includes titles ranked 200 to 5,000 that are not evergreen. 
Other than those books that have earned the status of “evergreen” in our sample, it is 
important to clarify that titles can change status from one year to the next, varying between 
best seller, top-seller, and deep-range. For example, bestsellers may move up or down the 
ranks, with the potential of becoming either a top-seller or deep-range title in the following 
year. To account for this fact, we selected a sample of titles that are representative of the 
different categories for each of the years under examination. This results in an unbalanced 
panel, where some titles are observed for the entire period, while others are only observed for 
some years. 
We also consider other potential sources of differences in the pricing policies, i.e. the 
type of binding (hardcover vs. paperback) and the genre. The type of binding represents a way 
of discriminating among consumers with heterogeneous valuation and it is often connected to 
inter-temporal pricing policies aimed at exploiting the different willingness to pay of 
consumers (Clerides, 2002). It is less clear whether retailers adopt different pricing strategies 
according to the genre, but we think it is worth investigating also this aspect. Therefore, in 
order to assess any potential effect of the merger that may affect only books with a specific 
characteristic and to offer a reasonable representation of the universe of books sold, we 
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include in our sample titles with different types of binding and genre.24 We complete our 
dataset by collecting information for each title in the sample on a number of title-specific 
characteristics such as the date of publication, the number of pages, whether it is part of a 
series and whether it contains figures.25 
Taking into consideration all the above criteria, we asked Nielsen to randomly select 
200 titles subject to the following conditions. At least 20 titles had to be evergreen; for each 
year at least 10 books had to be top sellers; around 50% of our sample should consist of deep 
range titles (to reflect CC’s concerns over this type of titles); each year some newly published 
books should be introduced. In addition to these constraints, we also made sure that the 
distribution of the main characteristics for each title category in our sample was similar to the 
distribution of characteristics in the population of all books sold in the UK. Some statistics of 
the selected sample are reported in table 2. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
Since the sales of each title vary over time, the composition of the sample in terms of 
title category may vary too. Table 3 reports the number of titles included in each category for 
each year. The annual size of the sample increases over time as titles published after 2004 are 
progressively added to the sample. Appendix 2 lists all 200 titles on which we perform our 
econometric analyses. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.3. The Control Variables 
In addition to the title-specific control variables described in the previous subsection, we also 
built a large dataset of variables to control for the areas’ demand and supply conditions. We 
consider several factors that may potentially affect demand and supply in the book retailing 
market. With respect to the demand side, we collected information on (i) population; (ii) 
population density; (iii) average sales of books in volumes; (vi) gross value added (GVA); (v) 
number of universities; (vi) level of education; and (vii) the diffusion of internet sales (which 
                                                 
24
 We employ Nielsen classification of genres, which distinguishes book titles in four macro-categories: (i) 
Children’s, Young Adult & Educational, (ii) Adult Fiction, (iii) Adult Non-Fiction: Trade, and (iv) Adult Non-
Fiction: Specialist. 
25
 If a book contains figures, publishers need to print in color, which in turn may raise the RRP. We do not know 
whether this may also affect the way retailers set the discounts, however we believe it is worth including this 
characteristic in the regression as a control. 
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we proxy through the level of internet penetration). The first four variables are mainly aimed 
at controlling for the dimension of the market, while the latter should provide an indication on 
the local population’s propensity to buy books –i.e. the demand conditions. With regard to the 
supply side, we gathered data on: (i) potential cost shifters such as the cost of paper and 
average house prices as a proxy of the cost incurred for opening a store; and (ii) a measure of 
the intensity of competition –i.e. the number of different retailers operating in a given area 
and their entry and exit rates. Except for the cost of paper, which is an internationally traded 
commodity, as well as for area-specific variables (such as those related to the intensity of 
competition), all other variables were collected both at the local and the national level. All 
variables are described more in-depth in table 4. Tables 4a and 4b provide descriptive 
statistics for the set of variables used in the local and in the national analysis respectively. 
[insert Table 4 here] 
[insert Table 4a here] 
[insert Table 4b here] 
4. Empirical Analysis 
The analysis we undertake aims at evaluating the effects of the Waterstone’s/Ottakar’s merger 
on the retail market for books in the UK. Since commercial data providers only hold data on 
prices, while all the information on the range of books stocked and on the quality of service 
are held by the retailers themselves, our econometric analysis focuses on the effects of the 
merger on the price dimension. The dependent variable of interest is the discount applied to 
RRP, because this is the variable retailers compete on. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, 
we often refer to prices and price competition in the text.  
To get a comprehensive picture of the merger’s effect, we perform two distinct 
econometric analyses. Our preferred approach in terms of the richness of the data and of the 
identification strategy examines the impact of the merger at the local level. It compares prices 
in areas that should have been more affected by the merger (overlap areas) with prices in 
areas that should have been less affected by the merger (non-overlap areas) using the DiD 
methodology. Of course, this analysis is only meaningful in the presence of some price 
variability at the local level. Therefore, as a preliminary step, we perform a statistical analysis 
to observe whether there is sufficient price variability across local markets. In addition to the 
analysis of prices at the local level, we also measure the effect of the merger on nationally 
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aggregated prices, using two different control groups: the prices set by the competitors and 
the prices of top-titles. This complementary empirical exercise should provide important 
additional information by measuring the merger’s effect on prices at a different aggregation 
level. Clearly, this implies that it relies on a different identification strategy. In the remaining 
of this section, we describe the econometric methodology used in our main analysis, i.e. the 
DiD at the local level. In Section 5 we describe the methodology used in the DiD at the 
national level. 
 
4.1 Local Price Variability 
We calculate the standard deviation of the discounts granted by Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s 
across the 60 stores in our sample for each title and for each month.26 For each title in a given 
month, we consider the average percentage discount applied by each store selling that title. 
We then compute the standard deviation of these percentage discounts across stores. Finally, 
we estimate the distribution function of the standard deviation using a kernel density 
estimator. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the standard deviation of the discount across 
stores for all the titles together pre- and post-merger as well as for each of the four categories 
of titles. The standard deviation across stores is slightly lower (more concentrated around 0) 
in the post-merger period. However, the reduction in the variability after the merger is 
limited, which does not suggest any relevant change in the geographic scope of competition. 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
The discount variability seems to substantially differ across categories over the whole 
period, with a higher variability for top-titles and evergreens, but less disperse distribution for 
bestsellers and deep-range titles. Yet, we observe a significant difference in the distribution 
between the pre-merger and the post-merger period only for top-selling titles for which the 
variability is in both periods relatively high.27 
                                                 
26
 The analysis of the price dispersion across stores might be affected, at least to some extent, by the presence of 
bundle discounted sales in the dataset. Bundle discounted sales, such as "3 for 2", are common across retailers 
and they are largely used as a promotional activity. Titles included in these bundles are effectively sold at a 
discount, which is greater than the one applied to stand-alone purchases. This implies that the more titles that a 
store sells through bundle-offers, the lower is its average selling price. As a consequence, some price dispersion 
across stores may be the result of different successful promotional bundle campaigns, rather than of different 
pricing policies. Unfortunately, we could not control for this problem, as Nielsen does not collect information on 
whether a book is sold as stand-alone or as part of a bundle offer. Therefore, the results relative to the price 
dispersion across stores must be interpreted cautiously. 
27
 In Appendix 3, we further investigate the aspect of the geographic aspect of price competition through the 
analysis of percentiles distribution.  
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Two conclusions can be drawn from this preliminary analysis on the discount 
variability across stores. First, we observe some discount variability across stores that might 
be consistent with price competition taking place at the local level, both before and after the 
merger. Moreover, the extent of local competition on discounts seems to vary significantly 
across categories, with deep-range titles at the lowest extreme and top-selling titles at the 
highest. This suggests that the parties tended to adopt a more uniform pricing strategy across 
the UK for the former category of titles, while for the latter titles’ category discounts seem to 
be set more frequently set at local level. Pricing policies for bestsellers and evergreen titles lie 
somewhere in-between. Overall, we cannot rule out the possibility that prices are, at least to 
some extent, set at the store level, since we find evidence of some variability in local prices.  
 
4.2 Local Analysis: Average Treatment Effect  
In Figure 2, we plot the monthly average discounts in the overlap and non-overlap locations 
for the different categories of titles. If the merger increased the price –i.e. reduced the 
discount– we would expect to observe an increase in the vertical distance between overlap 
and non-overlap lines after the merger. Yet apparently, discounts in overlap areas tend to 
follow broadly the same pattern as those in non-overlap areas and do not seem to be 
systematically lower post-merger. We observe different patterns across categories. The 
discounts on bestsellers and deep-range titles seem to have slightly decreased over time. 
Apparently this trend started well before the merger. Discounts on evergreen titles decreased 
over time as well, although the trend is less marked. The discount pattern for top-selling titles 
is less clear.28 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
The hypothesis we test is that, if local managers were free to set prices at the store 
level and the merger had anticompetitive effects, these effects should have been larger in the 
overlap areas, because of the reduction in local competition brought about by the merger. We 
therefore estimate the following regression: 
                                                 
28
 The more pronounced volatility is partially due the fact that our sample for these titles is small, which implies 
that a change in the discount that is applied only to a few titles may significantly affect the average. In particular, 
in the first four months of 2007 we have only one top-selling title in our sample, which was sold at a very high 
discount; this explains the sudden increase we observe at the beginning of 2007. This occurrence could affect the 
results for those titles. Therefore, when running the econometric exercise on top-selling titles, we exclude the 
data for the first four months of 2007. 
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where discist is the discount on the recommended retail price on title i granted in store s at 
time t, postt is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles observed in the post-merger period and 0 
before, overlaps is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles sold in overlapping stores and 0 
otherwise, Xi is a set of title-specific control variables, Zst is a set of variables aimed at 
controlling for changes across time in local market features, ηt is a time trend, νis is a title-
store fixed effect and εist is the error term.29 
Our key variable is the interaction between postt and overlaps, whose coefficient (δ) 
measures the price change in overlap locations relative to the price change in non-overlap 
areas: the average treatment effect (ATE). This coefficient quantifies the additional variation 
experienced by the prices in the overlap areas with respect to the average price change in the 
non-overlap areas. The post coefficient (β) measures any price change (between the pre-
merger and the post-merger period) common to all locations, while the coefficient λ, related to 
the overlap regressor, accounts for any idiosyncratic differences between overlap and non-
overlap areas that are not related to the merger.  
We perform a pooled regression on all the titles together in order to quantify the 
overall effect of the merger. We also run the regressions on each category separately, as the 
different categories of titles face different competitive conditions and are therefore expected 
to exhibit dissimilar discount patterns over time. 
In our baseline specification , we run a regression with fixed-effects for each 
title/store, so as to capture all the time-invariant title/store-specific (unobserved and observed) 
characteristics that may affect their prices. However, the use of title/store-specific fixed-
effects implies that the effect of the merger on discounts is solely identified from titles sold 
both before and after the merger, because the interaction variable is perfectly collinear with 
the title/store fixed-effects –i.e. it is time-invariant– for those books whose prices were 
observed only before or after the merger. This may affect the estimates because it reduces the 
                                                 
29
 We test for autocorrelation in the error process by means of the Wooldridge test. We strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. We thus cluster the error terms at the title and store level. As a further 
robustness check we also estimate regressions in which we impose an AR(1) error structure on the model. The 
resulting estimates are similar to those obtained by clustering the error terms. Finally, we also used monthly 
dummies as time fixed-effects instead of the monthly trend. Results are again unchanged. 
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size of the sample of titles on which the effects of the merger are actually measured and it 
does not allow us to capture any change in the prices of the titles published after the merger.30 
In our sample this problem arises from two different sources: (i) some of the titles 
included were published after the merger, and (ii) some of the titles included changed 
category over the period examined, which is clearly only relevant when we run the category-
specific regressions. The titles that belong to (i) are mainly top-selling titles and, in very few 
cases, bestsellers and deep-range books, while for the titles which belong to (ii) the problem 
spans across all the categories, since titles frequently move up or down the rankings from one 
year to the next. When we pool all titles together, the fixed-effects problem is not a big 
concern since the potential distortion comes only from titles that are published after the 
merger. These titles represent only a small fraction of the sample (19 out of 200 titles). Hence, 
in the pooled regressions we opt for a specification with fixed-effects at title/store level.  
When instead we run the regressions for each category of titles separately, the fact that a large 
proportion of titles change category over time, and in particular before and after the merger, 
poses a serious problem to the fixed-effect estimation. To overcome this problem, instead of 
the title/store-specific fixed-effects, we include a set of observable characteristics (both title-
specific and store-specific) that may affect a title’s price, using a random-effect specification 
within a hedonic pricing approach.31  
A further methodological issue we address is related to the selection of the window of 
data surrounding the merger to be excluded from the analysis, since we do not know when the 
merging parties started operating as a single entity. We consider two possible windows (6 and 
12 months) around the date of the merger clearance. We run all regressions using these two 
different samples where we dropped all observations inside the chosen window. We find that 
the results are essentially unaffected by the size of the window. We therefore only report 
results based on the window that drops the least number of observations, i.e. the one that 
                                                 
30
 In order to assess the impact of the merger on the titles published after the merger, we undertake a specific 
analysis that is described in Section 4.3. 
31
 The random-effect specification has a potential drawback as the estimator can be biased if there are 
unobservable characteristics that systematically changed after the merger occurred. Following the approach of 
Ashenfelter et al. (2013), we run the regressions on the sample of titles that remained in the same category before 
and after the merger using both a fixed-effect specification and a random-effects specification with title and store 
characteristics. The results of this comparison are presented in Appendix 4. We find that the estimate of 
treatment effect is similar under both specifications, thereby suggesting that unobservable product characteristics 
do not result in bias of the estimator of the random-effect regression.  
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excludes the 6 months around the merger date (3 months before and 3 months after the 
clearance), as this window allows a more efficient exploitation of the dataset.32 
Table 5 reports the results of the DiD regression (1). In the first column, we use the 
full sample of all titles with fixed-effects for each combination of stores and titles. The 
coefficient for post×overlap is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the merger 
does not seem to have had a different impact in overlap and non overlap areas. Columns 2 to 
5 report the results of the regressions run on best-selling titles, deep-range titles, evergreen 
titles, and top-selling titles respectively. As discussed above, for these specifications we use a 
random-effect specification. 
[insert Table 5 here] 
Again, the terms of interest, i.e. the coefficient estimates for post×overlap, are never 
statistically significant, which seems to confirm that the merger did not adversely affect the 
discounts applied by the merging parties in the overlap areas, on average. We find a 
significant and negative time trend for all categories, except the evergreen titles, which is 
broadly consistent with the graphical analysis discussed above. In addition, we also look for 
shifts in this trend after the merger (the post coefficient), and we find statistically significant 
effects only for deep-range titles, which exhibit a positive shift (+ 2.4%), and for top-selling 
titles, which have a negative shift (– 3.5%).33 We do not extensively report results on all other 
control variables, which mostly conform expectations.34 In conclusion, the merger does not 
seem to have on average adversely affected prices in the overlapping areas where it could 
                                                 
32
 We are aware the CC cleared an anticipated merger. However, according to press reports, Ottakar’s agreed the 
takeover offer from Waterstone's on May 31, 2006, and all Ottakar's stores were rebranded as Waterstone's by 
November of that year, i.e. few months after the clearance. This indicates that the parties merged soon after the 
clearance and, thus, that this may act as a good proxy of the date when the merger actually occurred. Moreover, 
the fact that the estimates are essentially unaffected even if we consider a 12-month window supports the view 
that the results are not sensitive to the exact identification of the merger date. 
33
 As a further check we also run the same regressions using time fixed-effects (i.e. we introduce a dummy for 
each month) instead of a linear trend and the results are broadly similar (results are available upon request). 
34
 We observe some common and statistically significant effects relative to the title characteristics. First, around 
Christmas the discounts (season) tend to be higher (except for deep-range titles). Second, paperback titles 
(paperback) are associated with lower discounts compared to hardcover titles (except for the top-selling titles). 
Third, the discounts appear to be lower (except for deep range books) as the time elapsed from the publication 
(elapsed_year) increases. Fourth, the publication of a new title is on average accompanied by promotional 
discounts (except for the deep-range category) as shown by the sign of the coefficient just_pub. Fifth, when a 
book contains figures (figure) the discount is on average lower. Sixth, titles that are part of series (series) are 
usually sold at a higher discount. Finally, the estimates indicate that Waterstone’s stores (the coefficient of the 
dummy waterstone) before rebranding applied on average a discount 1.6% higher than Ottakar’s shops. The 
other control variables included in the model are, instead, mostly not significant and, even when they are, the 
sign of the coefficients differs across categories. In particular, the variables controlling for local market features 
(i.e. nature and number of competing retailers, population, property price, urban vs. rural area, presence of 
universities and degree of education) do not seem to play a role in how the discounts were set. 
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have been expected to generate the strongest effects due to the increase in the level of market 
concentration. 
 
4.3 Local Analysis: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect 
The fact that we do not observe any significant average result might simply mean that our 
simple framework fails to model some important underlying heterogeneity in the merged 
entity’s conduct post-merger. Hence, we further exploit the richness of our dataset and we 
perform heterogeneous treatment effects estimations to more precisely investigate the impact 
of the merger on prices. In particular, we assess whether the effect of the merger differs 
between overlap and non-overlap areas along three dimensions: book-specific, firm-specific, 
and market-specific. There are good reasons to expect possible heterogeneous effects of the 
merger along these dimensions. The merger might for instance only affect the merging firms’ 
pricing strategy for the new products released after the merger as compared to old products; it 
can affect the extent of price differentiation between the merging firms if they internalize the 
externalities they exert on each other’s products; and finally it might have differential effects 
depending on the competitive conditions of local markets. 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for several heterogeneous treatment effects. 
In the first set of regressions our key variable post×overlap is interacted with firm-specific 
dummy variables. We try to identify whether there was a different pricing response to the 
merger between Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores if compared to their average behavior in 
non-overlapping areas. The results of these regressions suggest that there has been a 
convergence of the prices between the two merged chains in overlap areas after the merger. In 
particular, Waterstone’s stores reduced the discounts by 1.5% on average, while Ottakar’s 
stores increased them by 0.9%, when compared to non-overlap areas. This might have 
important policy implication as it has long been recognized that uniform prices can have a 
mixed effect on consumers’ surplus (e.g. Hausman and Mackie-Mason, 1988): some 
customers might be better off while others are worse off. Yet, to draw clear welfare 
conclusions about this change in pricing strategy would require an analysis of sales volumes 
for all book titles, which is unfortunately infeasible with the data at hand. 
[insert Table 6 here] 
We further consider whether the effect of the merger mainly materializes in the 
overlap areas where the merging parties closed a store after the merger. Yet, the coefficient 
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post×overlap×closed, which captures the effect of the merger in those areas, is not 
significantly different from zero, thereby indicating that not even in those locations where 
there was a reduction in the number of stores due to the exit of one of the merging parties can 
we observe a systematic difference in the prices after the merger. 
The second set of regressions deals with title-specific heterogeneity. As Ashenfelter et 
al. (2013) point out, it is important to explore whether the merger influences products existing 
prior to the merger differently from products introduced after the merger in order to correctly 
assess its effects. Also, with short-life cycle goods the firms’ pricing strategy in relation to a 
specific product may vary over time to reflect different demand and supply conditions. In the 
book industry, for example, we observe (see footnote 34) that retailers tend to grant higher 
discounts on titles that have been just published –i.e. in the two months following publication. 
The merger may have then had an impact on the parties’ pricing incentives, which vary 
depending on the elapsed time since the book publication. To capture this heterogeneous 
effect on initial discounts for products released after the merger, we partition the treatment 
effect into three components: (i) the component capturing changes in prices for those titles 
released before the merger (post×overlap×released_pre), (ii) the component capturing 
changes in prices for those titles released after the merger but only considering the first two 
months after release (post×overlap×released_post×just_pub), and (iii) the component which 
is identified by the changes in prices for those titles released after the merger, but only 
considering the period following the second month after release. However, in this case we 
must exert a note of caution, as we have only a few books published post merger in our 
dataset, all of which essentially belong to the top-sellers category. Hence the empirical 
identification of this effect might not be particularly robust. In fact, we only show estimates 
for top-selling titles. 
The positive and significant coefficient of post×overlap×released_post×just_pub 
suggests that stores in overlap areas seem to price newly released books more aggressively 
after the merger. Instead, the negative and significant coefficient of 
post×overlap×released_post×non_just_pub indicates that stores in overlap areas set 
significantly higher prices for titles published after the merger two months after the release 
date. This result seems to suggest that the merger might have also affected the firms’ 
incentives in relation to the timing and duration of discounts that retailers offer. This result 
should be taken with caution given the limited number of titles released post merger in our 
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sample. Nonetheless we think that the mergers’ impact on the timing of discounts/prices in 
short-life product markets may be a fruitful line for future empirical and theoretical research. 
The third set of heterogeneous treatment effect regressions deal with a market-specific 
heterogeneity. Similarly to Hosken et al. (2012), we look at whether the effect of the merger 
on prices differs according to the intensity of competition as measured by the number of 
competitions present in the market before the merger.35 In particular, we define the variables 
post×overlap×high_comp, post×overlap×medium_comp and post×overlap×low_comp, 
which represent the effect of the merger in overlap areas with high, medium, and low number 
of competitors respectively.36 Moreover, we investigate whether the merger had a differential 
impact depending on the dynamics of entry and exit. More precisely, we define the following 
variables: post×overlap×high_entry/ post×overlap×high_exit represents the effect of the 
merger in the areas where the entry/exit of 3 or more competitors occurred after the merger; 
post×overlap×medium_entry/ post×overlap×medium_exit represents the effect in the areas 
where there was entry or exit of 1-2 competitors after the merger.37 The expectation is that 
entry can mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of the merger. However, these latter 
interactions should be interpreted cautiously as there is a potential endogeneity problem (i.e. 
entry and exit may be triggered by the pricing conduct of the merged entity following the 
transaction).  Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates for these two sets of interaction variables 
are mostly not significant, indicating that market-specific characteristics that should capture 
differences in the areas’ competitive conditions do not seem to play a significant role in 
explaining the effect of the merger at local level.  
 
5. National Analysis  
So far our analysis focuses on the effect of the merger on local competition. However, the 
concentration might also have had an aggregate effect on national prices, which would not be 
identified through our local analysis. Therefore, we perform a complementary DiD analysis to 
investigate the merger’s effect at the national level. A major issue in implementing this 
                                                 
35
 Unfortunately, information on market shares in local areas is not available in our data. Hence, we must rely on 
the simple count of the number of competitors instead of a more precise measure of market concentration as used 
by Hosken et al. (2012) to analyze the heterogeneous effect of mergers in the US grocery retailing markets. 
36
 Areas are assigned to one of the three categories (high, medium, low) on the basis of the number of 
competitors that were present in each area before the merger. We define high, medium, and low based on the 
33rd and 66th percentile of the distribution of the number of competitors in all the areas. 
37
 These variables refer to generic bookstores like WHSmith since other types of competitors (e.g. supermarkets) 
do not have any significant variation in entry/exit episodes in the areas considered. 
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alternative analysis is the identification of a suitable counterfactual. To enhance the 
robustness of our results, we employ two different control groups: (i) the same titles sold by 
the competitors of Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s; and (ii) the top-selling titles sold by the 
merging parties. We describe the rationale behind both methodologies in turn. 
 
5.1 Competitors’ Titles as Control Group  
As a first control group for our DiD analysis with nationally aggregate prices, we use the 
prices charged by the rival firms.38 This control allows us to disentangle the merger effect 
from any common factors affecting both the treatment and the control group. Indeed 
exogenous supply or demand shocks affecting the whole industry should be expected to hit in 
a similar way the prices of the merging parties and those of their competitors. However, if 
firms compete on prices, the discounts applied by all retailers in the market are likely to be 
correlated and, thus, the merger may affect not just the discounts granted by the parties, but 
also those granted by their competitors. This would suggest that the prices of the competitors 
are not a valid control group. Yet, according to the standard theoretical merger model by 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) where firms compete in prices and goods are differentiated, 
any price change by the merging parties post-merger should be followed by a price change in 
the same direction by their rivals, but of a lesser magnitude. Comparing the change in prices 
of the merging parties to that of the competitors may therefore provide a useful indication as 
to whether the merger produced negative price effects. If we were to measure a positive 
average treatment effect, we might conclude that the merger resulted in higher prices even 
though we would be unable to measure the magnitude of the overall merger’s effect on prices. 
In this case the general estimation equation is: 
)(2ijtittijtjtijt ZXmergedpostmergedpostdisc ενηµγδλβα +++⋅+⋅+×⋅+⋅+⋅+=  
where discijt is the discount on the recommended retail price on title i granted by retailer j at 
time t, postt is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles observed in the post-merger period and 0 
before at retailer j, mergedj is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles sold by the merging parties 
and 0 otherwise and measures the time-invariant difference between the merging parties and 
                                                 
38
 Using competitors’ products as a control group is a common practice in this literature. For instance, see 
McCabe (2002). Ashenfelter et al. (2013) use a similar control group to identify the effect of the merger between 
Maytag and Whirlpool. However, in their case as the merging firms are manufacturers, their control group were 
rivals’ products within each appliance category. In our case, instead, we compare the same titles sold by 
competing retailers. 
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their competitors. Xi is a set of title-specific control variables and Zt is a set of variables aimed 
at controlling for changes across time in the demand and supply conditions at the national 
level, ηt is a time trend, νi is a title fixed-effect,39 and εist is the error term.40 The key variable 
of interest is the interaction between postt and mergedj, whose coefficient (δ) measures the 
price change of the merging parties relative to the price change of competitors attributable to 
the merger. 
Similar to the local level analysis, we start by plotting and graphically comparing the 
average discounts applied by the merging parties and the competitors (figure 3). 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
The discount patterns of the merging parties and competitors diverge over time. The 
former decreased their discounts, while the latter increased them. This appears to hold for all 
categories, except for top-selling titles, for which no clear trend can be identified either for the 
merging parties or their competitors. The diverging trend seems to start indicatively around 
the beginning of 2005, which is well before the merger was consummated. This may hardly 
be the result of the merger because it would imply that the parties started acting as a single 
entity one and a half year before the CC’s decision.41 We consider it more likely that the 
observed trends are the results of structural changes in the supply-side of the market. The 
“competitors” group contains a wide set of retailers, ranging from specialist and non-
specialist chains to supermarkets and internet retailers. According to the data provided by the 
Booksellers Association,42 the market shares held by supermarkets and internet retailers have 
continually increased over the past years, as shown in figure 4. 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
                                                 
39
 Similarly to the local analysis, in the regressions by category we replace the fixed-effect with product 
characteristics. A comparison of the estimated price effect using these two different specifications on the sample 
of titles that remain in the same category before and after the merger is presented in Appendix 4. 
40
 Like for the analysis at the local level, we test for autocorrelation in the error process and find that the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation is strongly rejected when the data are aggregated at the national level. To 
control for this issue, we cluster the error at the title level. 
41
 Some studies find evidence of anticipatory price increases before the parties were legally granted permission 
to merge (e.g. Weinberg, 2008). However, even if one considers the first announcement of Waterstone’s bid for 
Ottakar’s in August 2005 as the date when the parties started acting as a single entity, the diverging trend began 
some 8 months earlier. This seems to rule out the hypothesis that the merger triggered the negative trend in the 
discounts. 
42
 Booksellers Association website: http://www.booksellers.org.uk/Industry-Info/Industry-Reports/Book-
Industry-Statistics/UK-Book-Sales---Retail-1999-2008.aspx, visited October 2010. 
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This observation, in combination with the fact that supermarkets and internet retailers 
tend to apply higher discounts than specialist and non-specialist book retailers,43 may explain, 
at least partially, the increase in the average discounts for the “competitors” category.44 In 
other words, the apparent increasing trend may simply be due to a change in the composition 
of the group of competitors, where the increasing weight of supermarkets and internet 
retailers drives the observed pattern of the average discount. 
The fact that the discounts of the merging parties and the competitors show two 
diverging trends, which started before the merger, poses concerns on the validity of the DiD 
approach. Indeed, the common trend assumption that lies at the very heart of the DiD 
methodology seems to be violated in this case. We try to address this issue by imposing two 
distinct trends, one for the merging parties (month_t_merged) and one for the competitors 
(month_t_comp), so as to isolate the effect of the trends from that of the merger.45 
[insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2). In the pooled regression 
(column 1) with fixed-effects, the coefficients of both these trends are significant and have the 
expected sign (negative for the merging parties and positive for the competitors). The 
coefficient's estimate for post×merged is not significant in this specification suggesting that 
the merger does not appear to have had any differential impact on discounts, either between 
the merging parties or their competitors. Consistent with the results of the pooled regression, 
the analysis at the category level (columns (2) to (5)) shows that the coefficient's estimate for 
post×merged is never significant and that the coefficients associated with the trends, when 
statistically significant, are negative for the merging parties and positive for the competitors. 
The only exception is for the top-selling titles, where both trends are negative and significant. 
Finally, the post dummy, which should capture any common deviation from the trend after the 
merger, is not significant either in the pooled regression or in the category-specific one. 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the merger did not affect national prices. 
 
                                                 
43
 Anecdotal evidence on this is provided by a survey of market participants that we conducted for the CC (see 
Aguzzoni et al., 2011). Clay et al. (2002) instead find that, in the US market, online and physical stores have 
similar prices, although online prices are characterized by a higher dispersion. 
44
 This issue could have been addressed by splitting the data by retail channel and using only the large chains and 
independent shops channels as a control group. Unfortunately, Nielsen could not provide us with the data by 
retail channel because of confidentiality reasons.  
45
 The resulting estimates might be, nonetheless, biased as the linear trends may not be able to fully capture the 
different dynamic of discounts for the merged parties and for the competitors. 
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5.2 Top-selling Titles as Control Group  
To overcome the issues that arise when using competitors’ titles as a control group, we 
also perform an additional DiD estimation in which we use the top-selling titles as a control 
group. The top-sellers appear to be the category where the merging parties face the fiercest 
competition, as these titles are sold by all types of retailers and, in particular, by supermarkets 
which have the most aggressive pricing policy. Accordingly, the size of the discount is the 
largest for this category, as we see in figure 5 where the average discounts applied by the 
merging parties for each category are plotted. Therefore, the merger could be expected to 
have the most limited effect on the prices of these titles. In figure 5 we can also observe that, 
although the pre-merger price patterns in the control and the treatment groups vary across 
categories, they do not show diverging trends, which suggests that the assumption of common 
trends may be reasonable in this case. 
[insert Figure 5 here] 
The estimating equation is then as follows:  
)(__ 3iktttiktktikt ZXtopnonposttopnonpostdisc εηµγδλβα ++⋅+⋅+×⋅+⋅+⋅+=  
where discikt is the discount on the recommended retail price on title i in category k at time t, α 
is a constant, postt is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles observed in the post-merger period and 
0 before for category k, non_topk is a dummy equal to 1 for the titles in category k other than 
top-sellers and captures the systematic difference –i.e. not related to the merger– between top-
selling titles and other categories of titles, and the coefficient δ captures the effect of merger 
on these latter book categories –i.e. evergreen, bestseller, and deep-range books.46 This 
equation is run only on the merging parties’ prices. 
The results of the DiD analysis with the top-selling titles as the control group equation 
(3) are presented in table 9. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the estimates of the regressions 
with bestsellers, deep-range books and evergreen books as the treatment group respectively. 
The coefficient estimate for post×non_top that measures the effect of the merger relative to 
the top category, is never significant, thereby indicating that the merger did not differentially 
affect the discounts applied to bestseller, deep-range and evergreen titles if compared to top-
titles. We also check these estimates by using a specification with time fixed-effects instead 
of a linear trend and we find similar results. Overall, even though some caution in the 
                                                 
46
 Also in this case, the error term is clustered at the title level. 
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interpretation of the estimates is required because of the limited size of the post-merger 
sample for top-selling titles and, hence, that small variations on the discount on very few titles 
may artificially increase/decrease the average discount of the category, our results show that 
the merger did not produce any negative effect on prices at the national level. This is 
consistent with the outcome of the DiD regression that uses the prices of the competitors as 
control group.  
[insert Table 9 here] 
 
5.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
To mimic the heterogeneous treatment effects regressions performed at the local level, we 
also try similar specifications with the aggregated national data. In particular, we look at 
whether the national discounts of Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s in the different categories 
converged after the merger when compared to their competitors.47 Moreover, we analyze 
whether the timing of the discounts on books published post merger changed at the national 
level as well. In both cases, the results reported in table 9 suggest that the effects are generally 
not significant. The apparent lack of significant heterogeneous treatment effects at the 
national level (in contrast to what we observe at the local level) is not necessarily worrying. 
Indeed, this additional analysis should identify complementary nation-wide effects that are 
derived through a different empirical analysis, performed with different empirical strategies –
in particular with different samples and control groups. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
merger did not affect aggregate national prices, while it affects to some extent competition at 
the local level by altering the way the merging parties set prices in the overlap areas, though 
the average effect is insignificant also at this level of aggregation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The ex-post assessment of merger effects is an important and increasingly used tool to inform 
and guide the decision making of antitrust agencies in prospective merger cases. Despite the 
large number of mergers in the retailing sector that antitrust authorities have decided upon in 
recent years, there is lack of empirical work estimating the effects of consummated mergers in 
these industries. Our paper tries to fill this gap by econometrically analyzing the price effects 
                                                 
47
 We also performed the same exercise using top sellers as control group, and the results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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of the merger between two major bookstore chains in the UK –Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s– 
that took place in 2006. A peculiar characteristic of mergers in retail industries is the fact that 
they can exert their influence at different geographical levels since retail chains may set their 
pricing policies either at the national or local level due to the dispersed distribution of buyers 
and sellers. Unlike previous retrospective merger studies in other sectors, our empirical 
framework makes use of this feature to more precisely identify the effect of the merger. The 
availability of data at both the local and national level coupled with different identification 
strategies and, in particular, different counterfactuals, allows us to perform complementary 
assessments of the effect of the merger, which give a broader picture of its implications.  
We build an original database with rich information on a set of 200 book titles both at 
the store level and at the national level. In doing so, we take into account another 
distinguishing feature of the market under examination, namely the short-life nature of books. 
Therefore we select a sample of titles that does not remain constant over the whole period, 
using a hedonic price approach to account for the changes in the characteristics of the 
products that may impact on prices. 
As for the effects of the merger on local competition, we perform a DiD analysis 
where we compare the price change before and after in areas where both chains are present 
before the merger (overlap areas) to the price change before and after the merger in non-
overlap areas where only one of the merging parties is present. Our results show that the 
merged parties did not change their prices on average, in a significant way, after the merger in 
those overlapping locations where it might have been expected to do so. Also at the national 
level, results of two different DiD analysis – one with competitors as control group, and one 
with top-selling titles as control group– do not show any significant effect of the merger on 
prices.  
We further exploit the richness of our data to empirically identify a differential 
response to the concentration by the merging parties. After the merger, Ottakar’s –the 
perceived premium chain– significantly decreased prices while Waterstone’s significantly 
increased them in the overlap areas. We also find evidence that the top-selling titles released 
after the merger seem to differ in overlap areas in the timing of the discounts even though this 
effect is only identified by very few observations and, hence, its robustness is questionable.  
Arguably, the merger might have affected competition along different dimensions. In 
particular, it might have led to a reduction of the titles on offer and to a standardization of the 
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range stocked, which could have had a negative impact on consumer welfare.48 Unfortunately, 
due to the unavailability of data on variables other than prices, we were not in the position to 
assess the magnitude of this effect and how it may have impacted on consumer welfare, nor to 
ascertain whether it has been caused, or exacerbated, by the merger. Although these aspects 
do not seem to be crucial in the case under examination, as the survey of market participants 
seems to confirm, they might be relevant in other retail industries and therefore should be 
considered in further ex-post evaluation exercises.  
                                                 
48
 For instance, Inderst and Shaffer (2007) show in a theoretical model that retail mergers may reduce product 
variety. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Monthly Standard Deviation: pre vs. post-merger 
 
 
 
 
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
.
1
De
n
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
stdv of monthly % discount
Pre-Merger Post-Merger
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5000
Monthly prices
All titles
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
De
n
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
stdv of monthly % discount
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.0000
Monthly prices
Best sellers
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
De
n
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
stdv of monthly % discount
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.0000
Monthly prices
Deep Range
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
De
n
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
stdv of monthly % discount
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.0000
Monthly prices
Evergreen
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
De
n
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
stdv of monthly % discount
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.0000
Monthly prices
Top
Pre-Merger Post-Merger
34 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the Monthly Discounts: Overlap vs. Non-overlap Locations 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of monthly national discounts: merging parties vs competitors 
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Figure 4: Retailing book market: market share by volumes 
 
Source: http://www.booksellers.org.uk/ 
 
Figure 5: Average discounts by category – the merging parties 
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Table 1: National Market Shares of Retailers (based on the value of sales in 2005) 
Firm Market shares 
Waterstone’s 17% 
Ottakar’s 7% 
Other specialist bookshops, including Borders and Blackwells 15% 
Other stores, including WHSmith 19% 
Supermarkets 8% 
Internet 8% 
Book clubs and other distance sellers 15% 
Other 10% 
Total 100%
Source: CC’s calculations based on TNS and Nielsen Bookscan data. 
 
Table 2: Number of titles by genre and type of binding 
 
 Hardcover Paperback Total 
Fiction 6 56 62 
Specialist - 20 20 
Trade 16 50 66 
Young 6 46 52 
Total 28 172 200 
 
Table 3: Number of titles by category and year 
 
Book Type  
Bestseller Deep-range Evergreen Top-sellers Total 
2004 40 76 20 18 154 
2005 65 82 20 12 179 
2006 54 106 20 11 191 
2007 44 126 20 10 200 
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Table 4: Description of control variables 
Variable Description Source 
overlap Dummy=1 if overlap area  
post Dummy=1 if post merger (after 
June 2006) 
 
discount [RRP – (sales values/sales 
volumes)]/RRP*100 
Nielsen Bookscan 
month_t Monthly trend  
closed Dummy=1 if  Waterstone’s or 
Ottakar’s closed a shop in the area 
 
season Seasonal dummy for Christmas 
period 
 
waterstone Dummy for Waterstone’s stores 
(before rebranding) 
 
trading_m1 Number of stores for specialist 
retailers 
 
trading_m2 Number of stores for non-specialist 
retailers 
 
trading_m3 Number of supermarkets including 
other retailers (e.g. DIY chains) that 
sell books as a part of a wide range 
of goods 
 
entry1 Number of stores for specialist 
retailers that have entered the 
market over the last three months 
 
entry2 Number of stores for non-specialist 
retailers that have entered over the 
last three months 
 
entry3 Number of supermarkets including 
other retailers (e.g. DIY chains), 
selling books as a part of a wide 
range of goods, that have entered 
over the last three months 
 
exit1 Number of stores for specialist 
retailers that have exited over the 
last three months 
 
exit2 Number of stores for non-specialist 
retailers that have exited over the 
last three months 
 
exit3 Number of supermarkets including 
other retailers (e.g. DIY chains), 
selling books as a part of a wide 
range of goods, that have exited 
over the last three months 
 
classD1, D2, 
D3,D4 
Genre (D1=Fiction, D2= Specialist, 
D3=Trade, D4=Young) 
 
Series Dummy=1 for titles which are part 
of a series 
 
Figure Dummy=1 for titles containing  
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figures 
Pages Number of pages  
elapsed_year Years elapsed since the publication  
just_pub Dummy=1 for the first 2 months 
after publication 
 
paperback Dummy=1  for paperback titles  
avgsales_area Average sale volumes of 
Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores 
per area (in 2005) 
 
woodpulp Cost of paper World Bank 
internet Internet penetration Internet Access, Households and Individuals, Office of National 
Statistics 
house_price House prices http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/ for England and Wales, and 
www.ros.gov.uk for Scotland 
population Population UK Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics 
section or Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics when relevant (2001 
census) 
pop_density Population density UK Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics 
section or Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics when relevant (2001 
census) 
urban area Dummy=1 for areas with number of 
inhabitants per hectare>1.5 (OECD 
definition) 
UK Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics 
section or Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics when relevant (2001 
census) 
universities Number of universities http://www.lovemytown.co.uk/Universities/UniversitiesTable1.asp  
 
education Average level of education 
measured using 7 levels as defined 
by the National Qualification 
Framework. These levels range 
from 1 (secondary education -
GCSE- with marks below or equal 
to D) to 7 (Doctoral degree). 
UK Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics 
section or Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics when relevant (2001 
census) 
GVA Gross value added. It measures the 
contribution to the economy of each 
individual producer, industry or 
sector. GVA = GDP–taxes on 
products  +subsidies on products. 
UK Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics 
section or Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics when relevant (2001 
census) 
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Table 4a: Descriptive statistics of control variables for local analysis 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
overlap 207690 0.49 0.50 
post 207690 0.39 0.49 
discount 207690 10.58 12.93 
month_t 207690 24.25 13.33 
closed 207690 0.07 0.25 
season 207690 0.19 0.40 
waterstone 207690 0.54 0.50 
trading_m1 207690 0.91 1.45 
trading_m2 207690 9.58 7.19 
trading_m3 207690 7.49 6.15 
entry1 204013 0.02 0.12 
entry2 204013 0.09 0.29 
entry3 204013 0.05 0.22 
exit1 204013 0.01 0.09 
exit2 204013 0.04 0.20 
exit3 204013 0.03 0.18 
classD1 207690 0.31 0.46 
classD2 207690 0.09 0.29 
classD3 207690 0.28 0.45 
classD4 207690 0.31 0.46 
series 207690 0.35 0.48 
figure 207690 0.51 0.50 
pages 207690 301.71 236.79 
elapsed_year 207690 3.34 3.47 
just_pub 207690 0.07 0.25 
paperback 207690 0.90 0.29 
avgsales_area 207690 190506.50 86660.03 
woodpulp 207690 5459.25 512.25 
internet 207690 57.25 6.17 
house_price 207690 195713.70 65260.84 
population 207690 182723.40 102776.00 
pop_density 207690 14.75 12.78 
urban area 207690 0.86 0.34 
universities 207690 0.85 0.73 
education 207690 20.53 6.02 
GVA 207690 17953.33 3979.17 
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Table 4b: Descriptive statistics of control variables for national analysis 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
post 24236 0.46 0.50 
discount 23461 11.27 11.56 
month_t 24236 26.21 13.47 
season 24236 0.17 0.37 
waterstone 24236 0.33 0.47 
classD1 24236 0.29 0.45 
classD2 24236 0.11 0.31 
classD3 24236 0.31 0.46 
classD4 24236 0.29 0.45 
series 24236 0.32 0.47 
Figure 24236 0.53 0.50 
Pages 24236 313.23 265.84 
elapsed_year 24236 3.81 3.89 
just_pub 24236 0.04 0.20 
paperback 24236 0.88 0.32 
woodpulp 24236 5527.23 527.41 
internet 24236 56.52 4.18 
house_price 24236 199573.00 15123.11 
GDP per capita 24236 0.021 0.001 
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Table 5: DiD on Local Prices - Average Treatment Effect 
 All titles Bestsellers Deep-range Evergreen Top-sellers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overlap  0.369 0.121 0.041 0.503 
  (0.974) (0.540) (0.122) (1.085) 
Post 1.361*** 0.987* 2.363*** -0.387 -3.469*** 
 (5.94) (1.881) (9.789) (-1.015) (-3.469) 
overlap×post -0.290 -0.061 -0.148 0.112 -0.147 
 
(-1.38) (-0.119) (-0.684) (0.310) (-0.202) 
month_t -0.117*** -0.221*** -0.116*** -0.009 -0.008 
 (-10.77) (-13.370) (-14.410) (-0.572) (-0.329) 
Constant 18.701*** 10.88*** 14.83*** 5.596*** 11.27*** 
 
(5.77) (4.604) (11.23) (2.844) (3.408) 
      
Observations 172,991 37,094 58,098 56,955 20,433 
Number of id 11,833 4,544 6,909 2,445 2,930 
R-squared 0.061     
Cluster ISAN×ISBN ISAN×ISBN ISAN×ISBN ISAN×ISBN ISAN×ISBN 
Effects (ISAN×ISBN) Fixed Random Random Random Random 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price discount. In all columns we control for the following variables (see 
Table 4 for the description of control variables): trading_m1, trading_m2, trading_m3, entry (1, 2, 3), exit (1, 2, 
3), season, woodpulp, internet, the housing price, GVA, and elapsed_year. In the random effects specifications 
(columns 2 to 5) we additionally control for waterstone, avgsales_area, population, pop_density, urban area, 
universities, education, classD2, classD3, classD4, series, figure, pages, paperback. Robust t-statistics (column 
1) and z-statistic (columns 2 to 5) in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. ISAN is the Nielsen’s unique identifier of a store while ISBN is the unique 
identifier of a title. 
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Table 6: DiD on Local Prices – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
 All titles Bestsellers Deep-range Evergreen Top-sellers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
WATERSTONE’S/OTTAKAR’S 
overlap×post×Waterstones -1.496*** -1.536** -0.560** -1.166*** -0.815 
 (-5.750) (-2.375) (-2.118) (-2.723) (-0.942) 
overlap×post×Ottakars 0.927*** 1.540*** 0.237 1.430*** 0.542 
 (3.710) (2.771) (0.905) (3.364) (0.650) 
BOOKS PUBLISHED POST MERGER 
overlap×post×released_post×just_pub     1.648** 
     
(2.245) 
overlap×post×released_post×non_just_pub     -2.248*** 
     
(-2.816) 
overlap×post×released_pre -0.284 -0.097 -0.146 0.112 0.440 
 
(-1.35) (-0.184) (-0.674) (0.310) (0.331) 
STORE CLOSURES      
overlap×post×closed -0.363 0.183 0.146 0.166 -1.774 
 (-0.78) (0.182) (0.298) (0.224) (-1.139) 
overlap×post×non_closed -0.282 -0.091 -0.192 0.105 0.039 
 (-1.30) (-0.174) (-0.863) (0.285) (0.052) 
SPECIALIZED + GENERICS 
overlap×post×high comp -0.301 -0.087 -0.131 0.112 -0.630 
 (-1.03) (-0.133) (-0.476) (0.240) (-0.682) 
overlap×post×medium comp -0.345 -0.409 -0.141 0.156 -0.204 
 (-1.21) (-0.620) (-0.493) (0.334) (-0.230) 
overlap×post×low comp -0.155 0.703 -0.204 0.027 0.760 
 (-0.44) (0.863) (-0.552) (0.049) (0.729) 
SUPERMARKETS 
overlap×post×high comp -0.067 0.156 -0.193 0.329 -1.284 
 (-0.25) (0.249) (-0.705) (0.717) (-1.388) 
overlap×post×medium comp -0.357 -0.480 0.032 0.075 0.584 
 (-1.04) (-0.612) (0.096) (0.138) (0.573) 
overlap×post×low comp -0.530* -0.025 -0.239 -0.123 0.631 
 (-1.77) (-0.036) (-0.791) (-0.261) (0.707) 
ENTRY 
overlap×post×high entry  -0.866** -0.365 -0.234 -0.050 -2.264 
 (-1.97) (-0.388) (-0.561) (-0.074) (-1.599) 
overlap×post×medium entry  -0.023 0.424 -0.391 0.317 -0.659 
 (-0.07) (0.589) (-1.302) (0.607) (-0.639) 
overlap×post×no entry  -0.275 -0.189 -0.002 0.065 0.514 
 (-1.11) (-0.322) (-0.008) (0.160) (0.655) 
EXIT 
overlap×post×medium exit  -0.601* -0.212 -0.086 -0.338 0.035 
 (-1.66) (-0.269) (-0.237) (-0.607) (0.032) 
overlap×post×no exit  -0.195 -0.012 -0.169 0.245 -0.202 
 (-0.87) (-0.021) (-0.742) (0.645) (-0.268) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price discount. We only report coefficients for the interaction variables that represent heterogeneous 
treatment effects. In all columns we control for the following variables (see Table 4 for the description of control variables): month_t, 
trading_m1, trading_m2, trading_m3, entry (1, 2, 3), exit (1, 2, 3), season, woodpulp, internet, the housing price, GVA, and elapsed_year. 
In the random effects specifications (columns 2 to 5) we additionally control for waterstone, avgsales_area, population, pop_density, urban 
area, universities, education, classD2, classD3, classD4, series, figure, pages, paperback. Robust t-statistics (column 1) and z-statistic 
(columns 2 to 5) in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 7: DiD on National Prices –  Average Treatment Effect 
Competitors as control group 
 
All titles 
(1) 
Bestsellers 
(2) 
Deep-range 
(3) 
Evergreen 
(4) 
Top-sellers 
(5) 
merged  0.225 -3.861*** 0.005 -1.483 
  (0.078) (-2.749) (0.003) (-0.526) 
post -0.732 -3.562 -0.360 -1.668 -4.795 
 (-0.766) (-1.538) (-0.269) (-1.262) (-0.958) 
post×merged
 
0.108 0.692 0.646 0.365 -2.751 
 (0.089) (0.229) (0.421) (0.176) (-0.470) 
month_t_merged -0.134*** -0.349*** -0.109*** 0.014 -0.445** 
 (-3.294) (-3.223) (-2.845) (0.129) (-2.312) 
month_t_comp 0.072* -0.020 0.069 0.192*** -0.311* 
 (1.922) (-0.234) (1.420) (2.734) (-1.652) 
constant 218.100*** 21.770 47.390** 60.62** -146.500 
 (3.318) (0.485) (2.165) (2.047) (-1.571) 
      
observations 13,346 2,417 7,173 2,913 814 
R-squared 0.064     
number of id 400 156 270 82 98 
cluster ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN 
Effects (ISBN×retailer) Fixed Random Random Random Random 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price discount. In all columns we control for the following variables 
(see Table 4 for the description of control variables): season, woodpulp, ip, avg_hp, gdp_pc, just_pub, 
and elapsed_year. In the random effects specifications (columns 2 to 5) we additionally control for pages, 
series, figure, paperback, classD2, classD3, classD4. Robust t-statistics (column 1) and z-statistic 
(columns 2 to 5) in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. 
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Table 8: DiD on National Prices –  Average Treatment Effect 
Top-selling Titles as Control Group 
 
Bestsellers 
(1) 
Deep-range 
(2) 
Evergreen 
(3) 
non_top
 
-9.144*** -17.679*** -4.714** 
 (-3.73) (-7.32) (-2.08) 
post  -6.463 -4.812 -6.841 
 (-1.35) (-1.09) (-1.59) 
overlap×non_top 1.431 6.322 5.164 
 (0.36) (1.52) (1.40) 
month_t -0.323** -0.210*** 0.016 
 (-2.42) (-3.82) (0.10) 
Constant 53.245 19.447 35.875 
 (0.82) (0.70) (0.66) 
Observations 1,526 3,457 1,696 
number of id 127 184 90 
Cluster ISBN ISBN ISBN 
Individual Effects Random Random Random 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price discount. In all columns we control for 
the following variables (see Table 4 for the description of control variables): season, 
woodpulp, ip, avg_hp, gdp_pc, just_pub, elapsed_year, pages, series, figure, 
paperback, classD2, classD3, classD4. Robust z-statistic are reported in parentheses. 
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Table 9: DiD on National Prices – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Competitors as control group 
 
All titles Bestsellers Deep-range Evergreen Top-sellers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
WATERSTONE’S/OTTAKAR’S 
post×merged×Waterstones 0.236 0.243 0.685 0.452 -1.301 
 (0.210) (0.088) (0.453) (0.248) (-0.239) 
post×merged×Ottakar 0.916 1.848 0.840 1.813 1.592 
 (0.816) (0.712) (0.558) (0.994) (0.344) 
BOOKS PUBLISHED POST MERGER 
post×merged×released_post×just_pub     8.571* 
     (1.880) 
post×merged×released_post×non_just_pub     3.353 
     (0.696) 
post×merged×released_pre      -5.850 
     (-1.030) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price discount. We only report coefficients for the interaction 
variables that represent heterogeneous treatment effects. In all columns we control for the following 
variables (see Table 4 for the description of control variables): season, woodpulp, ip, avg_hp, gdp_pc, 
just_pub, and elapsed_year. We impose two distinct time trends for the merging parties and for 
competitors. In the random effects specifications (columns 2 to 5) we additionally control for pages, series, 
figure, paperback, classD2, classD3, classD4. Robust t-statistics (column 1) and z-statistic (columns 2 to 5) 
in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Selection of areas using propensity score matching 
This Appendix describes the methodology used in the selection of the areas. In its database, 
Nielsen Bookscan, Nielsen collects information on book sales from a wide panel of 
Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores. As regards the pre-merger period, this panel includes 359 
Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores located in 203 different areas49 (defined at the local 
authorities level), of which 33 were overlap areas (as defined by the CC) and 170 were non-
overlap ones. To select the 60 stores for our analysis we followed an approach based on the 
Propensity Score Matching (henceforth PSM). PSM has its roots in the Matching literature 
and it was developed as a mean to correct for sample selection bias that may affect the 
estimate of the treatment effects. In non-experimental studies the assignment of subjects to the 
treatment and control groups is not random, thus the estimate of a causal effect obtained by 
comparing a treatment group with a non-experimental comparison group could be biased 
because of systematic differences between the two groups. In other words, units receiving 
treatment and those excluded from treatment may differ not only in their treatment status but 
also in other characteristics that affect both participation and the outcome of interest. 
The bias can be reduced if the comparison of outcomes is performed using treated and 
control groups which are as similar as possible. It might be relatively simple to assign a 
comparison unit based on a single observable characteristic. However, if the matching process 
is to be effective in mitigating the potential bias, one needs to consider a full range of factors 
across which the treatment and control group might differ. PSM allows this matching problem 
to be reduced to a single dimension. 
Under the PSM the degree of closeness among groups is measured by the propensity 
score, i.e. the probability of treatment, given a set of observed characteristics. The idea is that 
all relevant differences between the groups pre-treatment can be captured by observable 
characteristics in the data50 and these characteristics can be used to estimate the propensity 
score. Through this approach a propensity score (which ranges from 0 to 1) is attached to 
every unit and the treatment and control group are then matched based on it.  
                                                 
49
 From our selection we excluded all the shops in the London area as, although both Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s 
operated stores in that area, it was not considered an overlap location by the CC.  
50
 Once accounted for these differences, one can take assignment to treatment to have been random. 
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A fundamental requirement for this method is that the predicted probabilities of 
treatment, for control and treated units, must have a wide common support region, i.e. the 
existence of a substantial overlap between the propensity scores of control and treated units. 
In practice, we applied PSM accordingly to these steps: (1) Identify the relevant explanatory 
variables; (2) Estimate the predicted probability (pscore) of assignment to treatment for all 
areas; and (3) Match (without replacement) each treated area with the control area that has the 
closest pscore. 
In the first step the aim is to select all the observable explanatory variables that 
characterize the book retailing market at the local level (hence, we need variables that vary at 
the local level). These variables can be broadly classified in two groups: (i) factors that may 
impact on the demand and (ii) factors that may affect the supply. 
Using the above variables, we estimated the predicted probability of being in an 
overlap area running a logistic regression on the discrete dependent variable of treatment 
assignment.51 The results from this regression can be found in Table A1.1.  
                                                 
51
 The dependent variable is the treatment status (overlap area = 1; non-overlap area = 0). 
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Table A1.1: Propensity Score Matching, estimation results 
 
dep variable: 
Overlap 
Population 0.000001 
 (0.27) 
pop_density -0.0002 
 (-0.01) 
Avgsales 0.0000006 
 (0.09) 
Universities -0.00950 
 (-0.01) 
Education -0.00379 
 (-0.03) 
GVA (2004) 0.00008 
 (0.51) 
Internet (2005) -0.0419 
 (-0.27) 
house_price (2004) -0.000005 
 (-0.37) 
trading_m1 -0.0170 
 (-0.12) 
trading_m3 -0.0189 
 (-0.30) 
Scotland -0.412 
 (-0.33) 
Constant 1.659 
 (0.22) 
  
Observations 50 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
After the regression, each local areas is assigned a probability of treatment. By looking 
at the distribution of these predicted probabilities (see Figure A1.1) we can check if the 
common support requirement is satisfied. We conclude that there is substantial overlap and 
we are then reassured that we can find a sufficient number of treated local areas with a close 
enough match in the control group. 
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Figure A1.1: Pscore distribution by groups and common support 
 
 
The selection of the treated areas was also constrained by data availability52 and out of 
the 33 overlap local areas we could use only 20. For each of the 20 selected local areas we 
found the closest match in the non-overlap areas following the PSM approach. Table A1.2 
presents the final list of areas from this matching process.   
                                                 
52
 Some shops closed, or were not surveyed by Nielsen Bookscan. 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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Table A1.2: Store Matching Outcome 
 
Treated Control 
Location pscore store location pscore store 
a) areas where we 
selected only a 
Waterstone’s store 
Southend-on-Sea 0.110 W Oxford 0.111 W 
Worcester 0.269 W Nottingham 0.256 W 
Canterbury 0.308 W Bournemouth 0.300 W 
Kings Lynn 0.192 W Bath 0.189 W 
Milton Keynes 0.102 W Romford 0.103 W 
b) areas where we 
selected only a 
Ottakar’s store 
Folkestone 0.222 O Dumfries 0.222 O 
Bromley 0.033 O Barnet 0.033 O 
Cheltenham 0.169 O High Wycombe 0.171 O 
Guildford 0.162 O Barnstaple 0.159 O 
Harrogate 0.115 O Staines 0.115 O 
c) areas where we 
selected both a 
Waterstone’s and a 
Ottakar’s store 
Aberdeen 0.469 W Bristol 0.508 W 
Aberdeen 0.469 O Newport 0.382 O 
Chelmsford 0.285 W Stirling 0.294 W 
Chelmsford 0.285 O Elgin 0.279 O 
Coventry 0.167 W Chichester 0.167 W 
Coventry 0.167 O Newton Abbot 0.165 O 
Inverness 0.230 W Winchester 0.233 W 
Inverness 0.230 O Loughborough 0.230 O 
Huddersfield 0.071 W Stockport 0.072 W 
Huddersfield 0.071 O St Albans 0.071 O 
Crawley 0.203 W Derby 0.202 W 
Crawley 0.203 O Ashford 0.204 O 
Lancaster 0.198 W Wolverhampton 0.194 W 
Lancaster 0.198 O Andover 0.198 O 
Meadowhall 0.182 W Stoke On Trent 0.188 W 
Meadowhall 0.182 O Carlisle 0.186 O 
Norwich 0.309 W Leicester 0.316 W 
Norwich 0.309 O Aberystwyth 0.315 O 
Epsom 0.120 W Bedford 0.116 W 
Epsom 0.120 O Bishop's Stortford 0.123 O 
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A graphical representation of this selection can also be found in Figure A1.2, where it 
is possible to see that the matched overlap and non-overlap localities are equally spread 
around the UK (the only exception is for Wales, where there were no overlap areas). 
 
Figure A1.2: Geographic distribution of Treatment and Control Areas 
Treated local areas Control local areas 
 
 
 
 
For the selected localities we also tested the equality of means for the relevant 
explanatory variables and verified if the means across the two groups were not statistically 
different (see Table A1.3).  
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Table A1.3: Test on equality of means for explanatory variables 
Variable 
Mean t-test 
Treated Control t p>t 
Pscore 0.196 0.203 -0.26 0.793 
Population 180000 170000 0.48 0.633 
pop_density 14.051 13.62 0.11 0.912 
Universities 0.75 0.73333 0.08 0.937 
Education 19.9 20.6 -0.38 0.702 
Avgsales 180000 180000 -0.01 0.989 
GVA_2004 16876 16630 0.22 0.824 
internet_2005 56.4 56.833 -0.39 0.702 
house_price_2004 180000 190000 -0.61 0.548 
trading_m1  6.15 6.3667 -0.15 0.883 
trading_m3 15.15 14.767 0.11 0.916 
Scotland 0.1 0.1 0 1 
 
  
53 
 
Appendix 2. List of book titles for Waterstone’s/Ottakar’s merger 
Table A2.1 below lists the 200 titles on which we performed the econometric analyses. 
Table A2.1: List of the titles included in our dataset 
  Title Author 
1 7000 Baby Names: Classic and Modern Spence, Hilary 
2 Adventure of English, The Bragg, Melvyn 
3 Allen Carr's Easy Way to Stop Smoking Carr, Allen 
4 Amber the Orange Fairy: Rainbow Magic Meadows, Daisy 
5 Angel Price, Katie 
6 Angels: Miniature Editions . 
7 Animal Discovery Cards: Baby Einstein S. Aigner-Clark, Julie 
8 Art of Drawing Manga, The Krefta, Ben 
9 Atonement McEwan, Ian 
10 Bad Beginning, The: Series of Unfortunate Events Snicket, Lemony 
11 Bare Bones Reichs, Kathy 
12 Beginner's French: Teach Yourself Languages Carpenter, Catrine 
13 Bible Code, The Drosnin, Michael 
14 Blow Fly Cornwell, Patricia 
15 BMA Concise Guide to Medicines and Drugs Henry, John A. 
16 Body Double Gerritsen, Tess 
17 Body Shape Bible, The: Forget Your Size Discover Your Shape Transform 
Yourself 
Constantine, Susanna 
18 Bond Assessment Papers: Second Papers in Maths 8-9 Years: Bond 
Assessment Papers S. 
Baines, Andrew & Bon 
19 Broker, The Grisham, John 
20 Brother's Journey, A: Surviving a Childhood of Abuse Pelzer, Richard B. 
21 Brussels and Bruges: AA Citypacks Franquet, Sylvie & S 
22 Castle of Wizardry: Belgariad S. Eddings, David 
23 Cause of Death Cornwell, Patricia 
24 Change Your Life in Seven Days McKenna, Paul 
25 Chapter House Dune:(Bk. 6) :Gollancz S.F. Herbert, Frank 
26 Child Called It, A Pelzer, Dave 
27 Cigars of the Pharoah:  The Adventures of Tintin S. Herge 
28 Coast Somerville, Christop 
29 Coming Out Steel, Danielle 
30 Complete Beginners' Cookbook Watt, Fiona 
31 Concise Colour Medical Dictionary: Oxford Paperback Reference S. Martin, Elizabeth 
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  Title Author 
32 Concise Oxford Spanish Dictionary . 
33 Confusion, The Stephenson, Neal 
34 Contest Reilly, Matthew 
35 Cranks Recipe Book, The Canter, David 
36 Crucible, The: A Play in Four Acts: Penguin Modern Classics Miller, Arthur 
37 Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, The Haddon, Mark 
38 Dark is the Moon: View from the Mirror S. Irvine, Ian 
39 Dark Tower,The: D rawing of the Three (Bk. 2) King, Stephen 
40 Devil's Disciples, The: The Life and Times of Hitler's Inner Circle Read, Anthony 
41 Diaries 1969-1979:The Python Years Palin, Michael 
42 Dr. Gillian McKeith's Ultimate Health Plan: The Diet Programme That Will 
Keep You Slim for Life 
McKeith, Gillian 
43 Duck: My Thomas Story Library Awdry, W. 
44 Elder Gods, The Eddings, David & Edd 
45 Electrician's Guide to the Building Regulations (Approved Document P, 
Electrical Safety in Dwellings) 
. 
46 Elegance Tessaro, Kathleen 
47 English Grammar in Use with Answers: A Self-study Reference and Practice 
Book for Intermediate Students of English 
Murphy, Raymond 
48 English Passengers Kneale, Matthew 
49 Enormous Crocodile, The Dahl, Roald 
50 Essential Costa Brava: AA Essential S. Kelly, Tony 
51 Essential Teaching Skills Kyriacou, Chris 
52 Face the Fire: Three Sisters Island Roberts, Nora 
53 Faithless Slaughter, Karin 
54 False Impression Archer, Jeffrey 
55 Farm: Usborne Look and Say . 
56 Filth Welsh, Irvine 
57 Flat Stanley in Space Brown, Jeff 
58 GCSE Double Science: Chemistry Revision Guide - Higher (Pt. 1 & 2) Parsons, Richard 
59 Girls Only! All About Periods and Growing-up Stuff Parker, Victoria 
60 Girls Out Late Wilson, Jacqueline 
61 Girls under Pressure Wilson, Jacqueline 
62 Good Night, Gorilla Rathmann, Peggy 
63 Gordon Ramsay's Playing with Fire: Raw, Rare to Well Done Ramsay, Gordon 
64 Great Lies to Tell Small Kids Riley, Andy 
65 Harry Potter Pbk Boxed Set Rowling, J.K. 
66 High Fidelity Hornby, Nick 
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  Title Author 
67 High Hopes Hopkins, Billy 
68 Highest Tide, The Lynch, Jim 
69 Holy Bible, The: King James Version: Authorized King James Version . 
70 Holy Blood and the Holy Grail, The Baigent, Michael & L 
71 Horrid Henry and the Mega-mean Time Machine: (Bk. 13) : Horrid Henry Simon, Francesca 
72 Horrid Henry Meets the Queen: (Bk . 12) : Horrid Henry Simon, Francesca 
73 How to Boil an Egg:... And 184 Other Simple Recipes for One Arkless, Jan 
74 Humble Pie Ramsay, Gordon 
75 I Am Too Absolutely Small for School: Charlie & Lola Child, Lauren 
76 I Know You Got Soul Clarkson, Jeremy 
77 I Love Capri Jones, Belinda 
78 IEE on Site Guide (BS 7671: 2001 16th Edition Wiring Regulations Including 
Amendment 2: 2002) 
. 
79 "In the Night Garden" Little Library: Little Library: In the Night Garden . 
80 Innocent Graves Robinson, Peter 
81 Internet for Dummies, The: For Dummies S. Levine, John R. & Yo 
82 Introduction to Buddhism: An Explanation of the Buddhist Way of Life Kelsang Gyatso, Gesh 
83 Introductory Guide to Anatomy and Physiology, An Tucker, Louise 
84 Invisible Boy, The: Magical Children S. Gardner, Sally 
85 It's Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life Armstrong, Lance 
86 Jasper's Beanstalk: Jasper Butterworth, Nick &  
87 Jolly Postman, or, Other People's Letters, The: Or, Other People's Letters: 
Viking Kestrel picture books 
Ahlberg, Allan & Ahl 
88 Jonathan Strange and Mr. Norrell Clarke, Susanna 
89 Jose Mourinho: Made in Portugal - the Authorised Biography Lourenco, Luis & Mou 
90 Kalahari Typing School for Men,The:No.1 Ladies' Detective Agency S. McCall Smith, Alexan 
91 Kama Sutra, The: Great Sex S. Hooper, Anne 
92 Krakatoa: The Day the World Exploded Winchester, Simon 
93 KS1 Maths: Question Book (Pt. 1 & 2) Parsons, Richard 
94 KS2 Science: SAT's Practice Papers - Levels 3-5 (bookshop) Parsons, Richard 
95 KS3 Science: Revision Guide - Levels 5-7 Parsons, Richard & G 
96 Last Juror, The Grisham, John 
97 Last Term at Malory Towers: Malory Towers S. Blyton, Enid 
98 Learning to Counsel: Develop the Skills You Need to Counsel Others Sutton, Jan & Stewar 
99 Letter from America:1946-2004 Cooke, Alistair 
100 Little Miss Scary: Little Miss library Hargreaves, Roger 
101 Lord of the Rings, The: Return of the King (v.3) Tolkien, J. R. R. 
102 Lost for Words: The Mangling and Manipulating of the English Language Humphrys, John 
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  Title Author 
103 Lovely Bones, The Sebold, Alice 
104 Low-Fat Meals in Minutes: "Australian Women's Weekly" Home Library Tomnay, Susan 
105 Magician's Nephew, The: Chronicles of Narnia S. Lewis, C.S. 
106 Mammoth Book of Extreme Science Fiction, The: Mammoth Book of S. . 
107 Man Called Cash, The: The Life, Love and Faith of an American Legend Turner, Steve 
108 Memoirs of a Geisha Golden, Arthur 
109 Monkey Puzzle Donaldson, Julia 
110 Moondust: In Search of the Men Who Fell to Earth Smith, Andrew 
111 Mr. Christmas Hargreaves, Roger 
112 Mr. Fussy: Mr. Men Library Hargreaves, Roger 
113 Mr. Perfect Robinson, Catherine 
114 Mr. Uppity: Mr. Men Library Hargreaves, Roger 
115 New First Aid in English, The Maciver, Angus 
116 New Pocket Dog Training Fogle, Bruce 
117 New Rector, The: Tales from Turnham Malpas Shaw, Rebecca 
118 Next Accident, The Gardner, Lisa 
119 Nursing Calculations Gatford, J.D. & Phil 
120 Nursing Practice: Hospital and Home - The Adult Alexander, Margaret  
121 Office 2003 in Easy Steps: Colour Edition:In Easy Steps S. Copestake, Stephen 
122 One Child Hayden, Torey L. 
123 One Hundred Ways for a Cat to Train Its Human Haddon, Celia 
124 One Hundred Years of Solitude Garcia Marquez, Gabriel 
125 Other Side of the Story, The Keyes, Marian 
126 Other Woman, The Green, Jane 
127 Oxford English Minidictionary . 
128 Oxford French Verbpack, The . 
129 Oxford Reading Tree: Stage 4: Storybooks: the Storm Hunt, Roderick 
130 Pale Horseman,The (Hardcover) Cornwell, Bernard 
131 Pale Horseman,The (Paperback) Cornwell, Bernard 
132 Peekaboo Farm!: Peekabooks S. . 
133 Philip's Motoring Atlas Britain 2006:Philip's Road Atlases . 
134 Philosophy: The Basics: Basics (Routledge Paperback) Warburton, Nigel 
135 Picking Up the Pieces Britton, Paul 
136 Pippi Longstocking Lindgren, Astrid 
137 "Playboy": Bartender's Guide Mario, Thomas 
138 Precious Time James, Erica 
139 Pregnancy Questions and Answer Book, The Lees, Christoph & Re 
140 Prince, The Machiavelli, Niccolo 
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  Title Author 
141 Q Pootle 5 Butterworth, Nick 
142 Quick Course in Microsoft Excel 2000:Quick Course . 
143 Really Rotten Experiments: Horrible Science S. Arnold, Nick 
144 Rebecca Du Maurier, Daphne 
145 Recoil McNab, Andy 
146 Restaurant Guide,The:2004:AA Lifestyle Guides . 
147 Revenge of the Middle-aged Woman Buchan, Elizabeth 
148 Rick Stein's Mediterranean Escapes Stein, Rick 
149 River Cottage Meat Book, The Fearnley-Whittingsta 
150 Ronnie: The Autobiography of Ronnie O'Sullivan O'Sullivan, Ronnie 
151 Rottweiler, The Rendell, Ruth 
152 Rough Guide to Venice, The: Rough Guide Travel Guides Buckley, Jonathan 
153 RSPB Pocket Birds Elphick, Jonathan &  
154 Rules of Management: The Definitive Guide to Managerial Success Templar, Richard 
155 Russian Dictionary: Collins GEM . 
156 Salisbury and The Plain, Amesbury:1: 50 000:OS Landranger Map . 
157 Savage Stone Age, The: Horrible Histories S. Deary, Terry 
158 Secret of Crickley Hall, The Herbert, James 
159 Sexual Life of Catherine M, The Millet, Catherine 
160 Sharon Osbourne Extreme: My Autobiography Osbourne, Sharon 
161 Shopaholic and Sister Kinsella, Sophie 
162 Silly Verse for Kids: Puffin Books Milligan, Spike 
163 Silver Spoon, The . 
164 Smelly Slugsy: Read-to-Me Scented Storybook: "Fifi and the Flowertots" . 
165 Social Work: Themes, Issues and Critical Debates . 
166 Sorceress Rees, Celia 
167 South Africa: AA Explorer S. Shales, Melissa 
168 Sovereign: Shardlake Sansom, C.J. 
169 Spanish Verb Tenses: Practice Makes Perfect Series Richmond, Dorothy De 
170 Storm of Swords, A: (1) :Song of Ice and Fire Martin, George R.R. 
171 SUMO (Shut Up, Move On):The Straight Talking Guide to Creating and 
Enjoying a Brilliant Life McGee, Paul 
172 Taking ,The Koontz, Dean 
173 Tao of Pooh and Te of Piglet, The: Wisdom of Pooh S. Hoff, Benjamin 
174 Thief of Time: A Discworld Novel Pratchett, Terry 
175 This Little Puffin: Finger Plays and Nursery Games:Puffin Books Matterson, Elizabeth 
176 Thousand Days in Venice, A: An Unexpected Romance de Blasi, Marlena 
177 Thud!: Discworld Novels Pratchett, Terry 
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  Title Author 
178 Time and Chance Penman, Sharon K. 
179 Times Tables: Magical Skills (Level 2) :Magical skills Fidge, Louis & Broad 
180 Trojan Odyssey Cussler, Clive 
181 Truth, The: Discworld Novels Pratchett, Terry 
182 Twelfth Card, The Deaver, Jeffery 
183 Twilight Children: Three Voices No One Heard - Until Someone Listened Hayden, Torey L. 
184 Twist of Gold Morpurgo, Michael 
185 Twisted: Collected Stories of Jeffery Deaver Deaver, Jeffery 
186 Ultimate Dinosaur Glow in the Dark Sticker Book, The: Ultimate Stickers . 
187 Under Orders Francis, Dick 
188 Understanding Health and Social Care: An Introductory Reader: Published in 
Association with the Open University 
. 
189 Unlocking Formative Assessment: Practical Strategies for Enhancing Pupils' 
Learning in the Primary Classroom 
Clarke, Shirley 
190 Untouchable: Alpha Force S. Ryan, Chris 
191 Usborne Complete Book of Drawing: Usborne Activity Books . 
192 Vesuvius Club, The: A Lucifer Box Novel Gatiss, Mark 
193 Vieira: My Autobiography Vieira, Patrick 
194 Wasp Factory, The Banks, Iain 
195 Wedding Flowers: Over 80 Glorious Floral Designs for That Special Day Roberts, Stephen 
196 Wee Free Men, The Pratchett, Terry 
197 Wide Sargasso Sea: Student Edition: Penguin Modern Classics Rhys, Jean 
198 Wide Window, The: Series of Unfortunate Events Snicket, Lemony 
199 "York Notes on ""An Inspector Calls"": York Notes" Scicluna, John 
200 Yorkshire Dales: Walks: Pathfinder Guide Conduit, Brian & Mar 
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Appendix 3. Local vs. national price competition for Waterstone’s/Ottakar’s merger 
This Appendix presents some further results on the analysis of the geographic scope of price 
competition among book retailers. Figure A3.1 below compares the distribution of the 
discount’s standard deviation (calculated over the entire period) for the four title categories. 
 
Figure A3.1: Distribution of monthly standard deviation (comparison by title category)  
 
 
As already stressed, the discount variability differs across categories. Top-selling titles 
and, to a lesser extent, evergreen titles have a high standard deviation, while the discount 
variability of bestsellers and deep-range titles appears to be lower and concentrated around 0.  
This latter result suggests that for these titles price competition mainly occurs at national 
level. However, we cannot say, in particular for deep-range titles, whether this low variability 
was due to a strict application of a centrally set pricing policy, or to the fact that local 
conditions did not vary much (for example, because the demand for deep-range titles was 
scarcely elastic over the entire nation).  
To further investigate the issue of local price variation, we also examined the 
percentiles of the discount distribution. For each title in each month, we derived the 
percentiles of this distribution and analyzed them graphically. A higher vertical difference 
between percentiles would suggest higher dispersions of the discount across stores. 
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In the Figure A3.2 we plot a relatively narrow interval (percentiles 25th 50th and 75th), 
whereas in Figure A3.3 we plot a larger interval (percentiles 10th 50th and 90th). 
 
Figure A3.2: Percentiles of the discount distribution (25th, 50th, and 75th) 
 
 
 
Figure A3.3: Percentiles of the discount distribution (10th, 50th, and 90th) 
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The percentiles analysis confirms the previous results. We observe a high variability 
for evergreen and top-selling titles, a lower one for best-sellers and a very low one for deep 
range titles.  
Finally, we also verified whether there was any difference in the pricing policies 
adopted by Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s before the merger. This was done in order to check the 
opinions expressed by some market participants53 who claimed that Ottakar’s tended to have a 
more local-oriented pricing policy. Hence, we computed the discount variability across 
Waterstone’s stores before and after the merger and compared it with the same figures for 
Ottakar’s. In figure A3.4 we plot the distribution of the discount standard deviations across 
Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s stores before the merger. 
                                                 
53
 These opinions were expressed to both the CC during its inquiry and to us in the responses of our 
questionnaires.  
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Figure A3.4: Distribution of monthly standard deviation before merger: Waterstone’s vs 
Ottakar’s 
 
 
 
The graphical inspection shows no significant difference between the merged parties, 
suggesting that before the merger the extent to which Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s adopted 
local pricing was similar.  As expected, this holds all the more for the discounts applied once 
the merger was consummated (see the figure A3.5 below). 
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Figure A3.5: Distribution of monthly standard deviation after the merger: Waterstone’s 
vs Ottakar’s 
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Appendix 4. Comparison of estimated effects using title/store fixed-effects and title/store 
characteristics 
This Appendix presents a comparison of the estimated price effects of the merger under two 
different specifications. In the first one, we use product fixed-effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, while in the second one we include a set of time invariant product 
characteristics that may affect a title’s price and estimate a random-effects model. All 
specifications are estimated on the set of titles that are in the same category both before and 
after the merger, because it is only for these titles that the price effects are identified in the 
presence of product fixed-effects. We show this comparison for all categories but top-sellers, 
since very few titles are in this category both in the pre- merger and in the post-merger period, 
and therefore the fixed-effects specification is not feasible. 
The upper part of table A4.1 shows the comparison for the local analysis. In this set of 
regressions, we use either title/store fixed-effects, or a random-effects specification with title 
and store characteristics. The fact that the estimate of treatment effect is similar under both 
specifications suggests that unobservable product characteristics do not result in bias of the 
estimator of the random-effect regression.54 
Table A4.1: Comparison of estimated effects using fixed-effects and product 
characteristics 
 
Deep-range  Evergreen Bestsellers 
LOCAL ANALYSIS       
post×overlap -0.245 -0.193 0.039 0.090 -0.701 -0.127 
 (-1.02) (-0.84) (0.10) (0.24) (-1.11) (-0.22) 
Title/store fixed-effects YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Title and Store Characteristics NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 53,577 53,577 57,974 57,974 16,912 16,912 
NATIONAL ANALYSIS       
post×merged 0.814 0.798 0.365 0.386 2.301 2.375 
 (0.522) (0.510) (0.176) (0.186) (0.781) (0.801) 
Title fixed-effects YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Title Characteristics NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 6,422 6,422 2,913 2,913 1,041 1,041 
Notes: In the local analysis, the title and store characteristics used are: waterstone, avgsales_area, 
population, pop_density, urban area, universities, education, classD2, classD3, classD4, series, figure, 
pages, paperback. In the national analysis, the title characteristics used are: pages, series, figure, 
paperback, classD2, classD3, classD4. Robust t-statistics (for fixed-effects specifications) and z-statistic 
(for random-effects specifications) in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
54
 The category that exhibits the larger difference in the two coefficients is the bestsellers’. However these results 
have to be taken more cautiously because only a small proportion of titles (27 out of 62) belong to this category 
both in the pre-merger and in the post-merger period. 
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The bottom part of table A4.1 shows instead the comparison for the national analysis, 
using competitors as the control group. Again, we compare a specification with title fixed-
effects with a random-effects specification with title characteristics. Also in this set of 
regressions, the estimated coefficients are similar under the two different specifications. 
 
 
